Meet the Judicial Fixer for the Deep State.


PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
FILED REGARDING
JUDGE AMY BERMAN JACKSON 


 20-05113 

 _________________ 

 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________ 

 JOHN WORTHINGTON,
APPELLANT,  

 v.,  

 ONDCP et al  

 APPELLEES. 

 ___________________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of Columbia
(No. 1: 19-cv-00081) (Hon. Amy Berman Jackson) 

  


PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC


 BY: S/ JOHN WORTHINGTON 

 JOHN WORTHINGTON
90 S.RHODEFER RD E-101
SEQUIM WA.98382
425-919-3910

 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT……………..1-3

STATEMENT………………………………………………………3-8

REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING EN BANC………….8-9 

  1. THE PANEL’S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY  OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED  IN COHEN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES 819 F.3d  476 (2016), AND TEXAS v. UNITED STATES,  798 F.3d 1108 (2015), UPHOLDING RULE 7(b)………….9-11
  2. THE PANEL’S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY  OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED   IN CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. SEC, 137 F.3d  638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1998) AND PUB. CITIZEN,  INC. v. FERC, 839 F 3.d 1165, 1171 (D.C. CIR.2016)……11-12
  3. THE PANEL’S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY  OVERRULED U.S. SUPREME COURT  PRECEDENT BASED IN NATIONAL PARK  HOSP. ASS’N v. DEP’ OF INTERIOR 538 U.S.  803, 808 (2003)……………………………………………12-15
  4. CONCLUSION…………………….………………………………..15

I

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES

American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.   490, 539 (1981)………………………………………….…….…..14 

Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 143 (1973)…………………….……..14 

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,  

 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971)…………………….…….…………13, 15 

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502,  

 513(2009)…………………………………………………………..13 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 576 U.S. (2015)…………………..13 

Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S.   803, 808 (2003)……………………………..…………….12, 13, 15 

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp.,   496 U. S. 633, 654 (1990)………………………………….……..14 

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 201 (1947)………………….14 

U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS FOR D.C. CASES. Alpharma, Inc. v Leavitt, 460 F. 3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2006)……..…14 

City of New Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639  

 (D.C. Cir. 1998)…………………………………………………1, 12 Cohen v. Board of Trustees 819 F.3d 476 (2016)……….…..…1, 9, 11 

Fox v. American Airlines, Inc.,389 F.3d 1291, 1294  

 (D.C.Cir.2004)……………………………………………………….2 

Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1033–1034   (D.C. Cir. 1988)………………………………………..…….….….5

II 

U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS FOR D.C. CASES Cont Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1303–1304 (D.C. Cir. 1994)….….….5 

Graetz v. District of Columbia Public Schools, Civ. A.   No. 86-293, 1987 WL 8527, (D.D.C1987)…………………..….….5 

Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep’t of Def., 512 F.3d   677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2008)………………………….………….10, 11 

Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America,   644 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2011)………………………….……..6 

Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 839 F.3d 1165, 1171  

 (D.C. Cir. 2016)……………………………………………………12 

Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108 (2015)………….….1, 9, 10, 11 Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021 (D.C.Cir.2004)…….……2, 11 

United States v. Best, 961 F.2d 964, 1992 WL 96354,   (D.C. Cir. 1992)………………………………..………………….5-6 

Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425,  

 428 (D.C.Cir.2014)……………………………………….…..10, 11 U.S. DISTRICT COURT CASES

Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries,  284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003)………………………..…10, 11 

D.D.C. LOCAL RULE. 

7 (b)…………………………….……………………………In Passim 11………………………………………………………………….…..5 108(h)…………………………………………………………………5

III 

Federal Appellate rule 

35 (b)…………………………………………………………………..1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  

56(c)……………………………………………….………………….5  Federal codes 

28 U.S.C. 2401…………………………………..………………….11

IV 

 INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, John Worthington expresses a belief, based on studied circuit history of Rule 7 (b), and previous U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District  of Columbia rulings in, Cohen v. Board of Trustees 819 F.3d 476  (2016), and, in Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108 (2015), that the  panel decision is contrary to decisions of the United States Court of  Appeals for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Supreme Court  cases identified below. 

 Worthington also request the full court to accept review because the  trial court did not have jurisdiction in an APA case without a final  agency action as required by the longstanding United States Court of  Appeals for the District of Columbia precedence in City of New  Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and, the U.S.  Supreme Court cases identified below

 The Panel did not adhere to well established precedent established  in Rule 7(b), and allowed the United States Department of Justice to  get away with not answering legal allegations at the trial court and 

also enabled the government attorney to add legal arguments to a motion for summary affirmance. 

 The panel also allowed U.S. District Court Judge Amy Jackson  Berman, to make arguments for the United States Department of  Justice in a stark reversal of D.C. Circuit precedent and Rule 7 (b).   It is of great public importance to be free of federally funded law  enforcement looting mechanism’s and Rico Act revenue generation  schemes. Society needs law enforcement accountability now more  than ever. The panel had a golden opportunity to do so and failed.  The ‘Level playing field”1provisions of Rule 7 (b), were ignored  and judicial canons were violated, when the trial court Judge made  arguments for the United States Department of Justice. It is not the  function of the District Court judges to make arguments on behalf of the litigants, and save them from “distinct appellate repercussions” for “backhanding” arguments that should have “doomed” their case. 

  

1 D.D.C. Local Rule 7(b). The rule “is a docket-management tool that facilitates  efficient and effective resolution of motions by requiring the prompt joining of  issues,” Fox v. American Airlines, Inc.,389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2004), and  judicious enforcement of the rule “ensures * * * that litigants argue their causes  on a level playing field,” id. at 1295 (quoting English-Speaking Union v.  Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021 (D.C.Cir.2004)

 The panel ruling was an obvious radical departure from circuit  precedence and Rule 7 (b) and the “decades” old use of its “docket management tool.” 

This unprecedented ruling compels the attention of the full Court,  because the panel decision conflicts with D.C. Circuit and U.S.  Supreme Court precedent and shatters the integrity of the Court of  Appeals for the District of Columbia. 

 STATEMENT 

 John Worthington filed a complex combined complaint over the  actions of two multi-jurisdictional drug task forces in Washington  State in 2007. 

 Worthington alleged the task forces raided him and did not provide  a notice of intent to seize his property as is required by law.   In addition, Worthington made allegations one of the drug task  forces WestNET, was using its non-entity distinction illegally under  the Rico Act to collect monies from Worthington and the public.   Worthington also challenged the constitutionality of the ongoing Office of National Drug Control Policy and U.S. Department of  Justice policy to use state and local law enforcement to seize medical 

marijuana “summarily” as contraband without due process of state  law, which the drug task forces agreed to operate under.  The United States Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss  and Worthington responded with 45 pages and over 2000 exhibits in  response. The United States Department of Justice filed a three page  reply brief and left most of the arguments unaddressed.   Rather than enforce circuit precedence and Rule 7 (b), Judge Amy  Berman Jackson ignored Rule 7 (b) and made arguments for the  United States Department of Justice, and tilted the “level playing  field” in favor of the United States Department of Justice.  Worthington v. ONDCP et al was not played on a “level playing  field,” and the “docket management tool” used for “decades” in this  circuit, was left in the shed. This case was played on Cripple Creek.  The Circuit panel in Worthington v. ONDCP et al, consisting in part  of Judges Millet and Pillard, both with a long history of being judicial  enforcers of the 7(b) “docket management tool” and protectors of  the “level playing field,” broke from their previous pattern of enforcement and protection practices, and let the United States  Department of Justice escape application of the Rule 7 (b).

 When past litigants Cohen and Texas faced the “level playing  field” and circuit duo of Judges Millard and Pillett2, they felt the cold  steel application of Rule 7 (b), the “docket management tool,” and  the cold hard surface of the “level playing field.” 

 Cohen and Texas were informed this has been happening in this  circuit for “decades.” Quote: “Rules are rules, and basic fairness  requires that they be applied evenhandedly to all litigants. Rule 7(b)  (or its materially identical predecessor, Local Rule 108(b)) has been in  force for nearly three decades, see Graetz v. District of Columbia  Public Schools, Civ. A. No. 86-293, 1987 WL 8527, at *1 (D.D.C.  March 3, 1987).” 

 Furthermore, Judge Millet Wrote: “We have repeatedly held,  moreover, that a material failure to follow the rules in district court  can “doom” a party’s case. See, e.g., Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300,  1303–1304 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“When Geller failed to respond, he  conceded a violation of Rule 11 under Local Rule 108(b) [Local Rule  7(b)’s predecessor]; he cannot now argue the merits of his Rule 11 defense.”); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1033–1034  (D.C. Cir. 1988) (failure to designate and reference triable facts under  

  

2 The honorable Cornelia T.L. Pillard and Patricia A. Millet.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule 108(h) was fatal  to appellant’s opposition to motion for summary judgment)  Judge Millet wrote further: Texas’s tactical choice in district court  has distinct appellate repercussionsas well. We are “a court of  review, not one of first view,” United States v. Best, 961 F.2d 964,  1992 WL 96354, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (unpublished), so we rarely  entertain arguments on appeal that were not first presented to the  district court, see, e.g., Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of  America, 644 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (refusing to consider  claim that district court violated a local rule because appellant failed  to make that argument before the district court). And “we can find no  instance when we made an exception” to that rule because the  party’s chosen strategy of “backhanding” the issues in district court “backfired.” 

 Here, the litigant United States Department of Justice did not face  the same cold steel application of Rule 7(b), the “docket  management tool” and cold surface of the “level playing field,” and escaped accountability for horrible public policy and violations of  Rico Act statutes, when its case should have been “doomed.”

 The United States Department of Justice decision to “backhand” issues did not “backfire,” because Judge Jackson broke precedence to  make new arguments not made by the United States Department of  Justice and the circuit panel allowed even more new arguments in the  contested motion for summary affirmance. 

 WestNET should have been stopped from using awful public policy  to use federal tax dollars to loot citizens who try and grow medical  marijuana should have been halted in 2020. 

 WestNET should have been stopped from being used as a legal  entity to collect revenue as Rico Act organization. 

 A true “level playing field” might have stopped violations of law  and constitutional rights, but this “level playing field” in Worthington  v. ONDCP et al, tilted too far towards the United States Department  of Justice, and Cripple Creek. 

 The State of Washington and the U.S. Department of Treasury are  running illegal revenue collecting mechanisms through entities which  were never meant to function as a legal entity. They have done so  knowingly so they could pay for employees and other task force  expenditures. They never came close to the “level playing field.”  

 On more than one level, the federal government had checks and  balances to stop WestNET from being used as a legal entity, but the  WestNET executive board, comprised of federal, state and local  members failed at every level on purpose, so they did not have to go  back to component members to get task force funding.   Worthington tried to stop this illegal behavior and bad public  policy but the D.C. Circuit buried it. 

 The “decades old” circuit “docket management tool” was not  applied in Worthington v. ONDCP et al and this case was not  conducted on a “level playing field.” The United State Department of  Justice escaped accountability and now WestNET can continue its  Rico Act revenue collection scheme and the public looting policy can  continue on Worthington and the public at large. 

 This unprecedented ruling compels the attention of the full Court,  because it is of public importance and would protect the integrity of  this circuit, which assisted this case to the unpublished abyss. 

 REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING EN BANC  

 In this case of exceptional importance, the panel improperly  overruled Circuit precedent, and severely undermined the integrity of 

what many people feel is the second highest court in America.  Supreme Court Justices are regularly picked from this circuit. En banc  review is necessary to preserve circuit precedence and its nationwide  prestige as a court of honor. 

 The United States of America should not be funding and  participating in Rico Act revenue schemes against the public, and this  circuit should not be trying to bury this conduct in an unpublished  ruling.  

 If there is going to be such a blatant and repugnant departure from circuit precedent, the panel should publish that decision or the full  court should inspect the departure from Rule 7 (b), the “docket  management tool” and protect the “level playing field,” this circuit  has traditionally maintained. 

  1. THE PANEL’S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY  OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED IN COHEN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES 819 F.3d 476 (2016), AND TEXAS v. UNITED STATES, 798 F.3d 1108 (2015), UPHOLDING RULE 7(b). 

 This Court’s precedent resolves this case. The United States  Department of Justice failed to answer legal arguments presented by  Worthington. The Circuit panel in Worthington v. ONDCP et al,  consisting of Judges Millet and Pillard, the same judicial enforcers of 

Rule 7 (d), the “docket management tool” and protectors of the  “level playing field” in the cases above, broke from their previous pattern of enforcement and protection practices, and let the United  States Department of Justice escape the “docket management tool” and “level playing field” of Rule 7 (b). 

 The panel ruling conflicts with previous rulings on April 22, 2016,  in Cohen v. Board of Trustees 819 F.3d 476 (2016), August 18, 2015, in Texas v. United States, 798 F.3d 1108 (2015),( citing Wannall v.  Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425, 428 (D.C.Cir.2014) (citing Hopkins v.  Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25  (D.D.C.2003), Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021(D.C.Cir.2004).  A panel of this Court may not abandon Circuit precedent unless a  Supreme Court decision “‘effectively overrules’” or “‘eviscerate[s]’”  that precedent. Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep’t of Def., 512  F.3d 677, 684 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

 The Supreme Court has not overruled or eviscerated Cohen v.  Board of Trustees 819 F.3d 476 (2016), and Texas v. United States,  798 F.3d 1108 (2015). 

 Here, the panel clearly abandoned the ruling in Cohen v. Board of  Trustees 819 F.3d 476 (2016), and in Texas v. United States, 798 

10 

F.3d 1108 (2015),( citing Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc., 775 F.3d 425,  428 (D.C.Cir.2014) (citing Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of  Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003), Union v.  Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021 (D.C.Cir.2004), and the “level playing  field.” 

 This unprecedented ruling compels the attention of the full Court. 

  1. THE PANEL’S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY  OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED IN  CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639  (D.C. Cir. 1998) AND PUB. CITIZEN, INC. v. FERC,  839 F 3.d 1165, 1171 (D.C. CIR. 2016) 

 This Court’s precedent resolves this case. The United States  Department of Justice did not answer Worthington request for a final  federal agency action to invoke 28 U.S.C. 2401.Judge Amy Berman  Jackson also did not answer that jurisdictional impediment either.  Judge Jackson did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling on the federal  APA ruling without a final agency action. 

 A panel of this Court may not abandon Circuit precedent unless a  Supreme Court decision “‘effectively overrules’” or “‘eviscerate[s]’”  that precedent. Nat’l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep’t of Def., 512  F.3d 677, 684 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

11 

 The Supreme Court has not overruled or eviscerated City of New  Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1998) or Pub. Citizen,  Inc. v. FERC, 839 F.3d 1165, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2016), the other circuit  rulings enforcing this decades old precedence. 

 The jurisdictional predicate of final agency action must exist at the  time the petition is filed. City of New Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638,  639 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 

 Here, the only jurisdiction Judge Jackson possessed was  jurisdiction to order a writ to require a final agency action3, which is  what Worthington was requesting. Instead of exercising the only  jurisdiction the court had, the court took hypothetical jurisdiction  under the federal APA and dismissed the case without a verified final  federal agency action. Judge Jackson made a great glove save on the  “level playing field” and Worthington was denied justice.  

III. THE PANEL’S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY  OVERRULED U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT  BASED IN NATIONAL PARK HOSP. ASS’N v. DEP’  OF INTERIOR 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). 

 The U.S. Supreme Court precedent also resolves this case. Rehearing by the full court is necessary to ensure that this case is  

consistent with the Supreme Court ruling in Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v.    

3 Worthington made such a request but like most of his arguments, it was ignored  by the United States Department of Justice and Judge Jackson.

12 

Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003), requiring a final federal  agency action under the APA. 

 The trial court did not identify a final federal agency action to  which jurisdiction could be claimed. The trial court then ignored the  requested writ to force a final federal or state final agency action, and  improperly took jurisdiction to classify an act committed under state  law as a final federal agency action. 

 A court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513 (2009)  (internal quotation marks omitted), but instead to assess only whether  the decision was “based on a consideration of the relevant factors and  whether there has been a clear error of judgment,” Citizens to  Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971).  It is a “foundational principle of administrative law” that judicial  review of agency action is limited to “the grounds that the agency  invoked when it took the action.” Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,  576 U.S. (2015). If those grounds are inadequate, a court may remand  for the agency to do one of two things: First, the agency can offer “a  fuller explanation of the agency’s reasoning at the time of the agency  action.” Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. 

13 

  1. 633, 654 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Alpharma, Inc. v  Leavitt, 460 F. 3d 1, 5–6 (CADC 2006) (Garland, J.) (permitting an  agency to provide an “amplified articulation” of a prior “conclusory”  observation (internal quotation marks omitted)). This route has  important limitations. When an agency’s initial explanation  “indicate[s] the determinative reason for the final action taken,” the  agency may elaborate later on that reason (or reasons) but may not  provide new ones. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 143 (1973) (per  curiam). Alternatively, the agency can “deal with the problem afresh”  by taking new agency action. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,  201 (1947) (Chenery II). An agency taking this route is not limited to  its prior reasons but must comply with the procedural requirements for  new agency action. 

 The functional reasons for requiring contemporaneous explanations  apply with equal force regardless whether post hoc justifications are  raised in court by those appearing on behalf of the agency or by  agency officials themselves. See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc.  v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 539 (1981) (“[T]he post hoc  rationalizations of the agency . . . cannot serve as a sufficient  predicate for agency action.”); Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 419 

14 

(rejecting “litigation affidavits” from agency officials as “merely ‘post  hoc’ rationalizations”). 

 Here, neither the United States Department of Justice nor Judge  Jackson could take a position for the federal agency in Worthington v.  ONDCP et al. Worthington’s APA claims were not under the ambit Of the APA until there was a final federal agency action.  The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t  of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003), and the other U.S. Supreme  Court rulings did not permit jurisdiction without a final agency action  and the precedence of that ruling needs to be protected by the full  court. 

 CONCLUSION 

 Worthington respectfully requests the full court to promptly grant  rehearing en banc for Worthington v. ONDCP et al.. 

 Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of November 2020. 

 BY:S:/ JOHN WORTHINGTON 

 JOHN WORTHINGTON  

 90 S.RHODEFER RD E-101  SEQUIM WA.9838

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 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE  I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of  Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a) (7)(B) because it  contains 3733 words according to the count of Microsoft Word. This brief also complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a) (6) because it has been prepared in  a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2007, in 14- point Times New Roman font. 

 BY: // JOHN WORTHINGTON 

 John Worthington Pro Se  4500 SE 2ND PL. 

 Renton WA.98059 

 425-919-3910

16 

 Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of November, 2020, I will mail to  the Clerk of Court by U.S. Certified Mail, and then send a  notification of such filing to the following by US certified Mail to: 

Johnny Hillary Walker , III 

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 2242 

Washington, DC 20530-0001 

johnny.walker@usdoj.gov 

 BY: // JOHN WORTHINGTON 

 John Worthington Pro Se 

 4500 SE 2ND PL. 

 Renton WA.98059 

 425-919-3910 

 

17 

  

  Judicial Canon 2 A. 

 Final Score 

 Hall of Justice league 30 Worthington nil   ADDENDUM

18 

 CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES.   RULINGS UNDER REVIEW, AND RELATED CASES 

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a) (1), Plaintiff-Appellant hereby certifies as follows: 

  1. Parties and Amici Curiae 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Plaintiff”) is John WorthingtonDefendants Appellees (“Defendants”) are the United States of America, Office of  National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), U.S. Department of Justice  (U.S.D.O.J.)  

 The defendants are also Jovita Carranza and the U.S. Treasury  Department, which is in custody of the asset forfeiture account  WestNET member agencies agreed to a federal equitable sharing  agreement, which contains or has contained, unlawfully obtained  debts using the unlawful entity WestNET. The U.S. Treasury  Department is the culpable agency for the current and past appointed  or assigned treasurer of the equitable asset sharing account under the  command and control of O.N.D.C.P., U.S.D.O.J. Jovita Carranza and  the U.S. Treasury Department is a “person,” as that term is defined  pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO. WestNET is an “enterprise” as  that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(4) of RICO. 

19 

 The defendants are also Matthew George Whitaker, Jeffery Felten Green, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance office of programs, which  funded by ONDCP and are under the command and control of the  multi-jurisdictional drug task forces TNET WestNET and the DEA.  Defendant Whitaker is also in custody of the asset forfeiture and  money laundering section, a separate account under the equitable  sharing agreement signed by WestNET member entities under the  command and control of ONDCP, U.S.D.OJ , which contains or has  contained, unlawful revenues collected using the unlawful entity  WestNET. The U.S. Department of Justice is the culpable Agency for  the current and past elected, appointed or assigned employees who  held total control over the existence and finances of the unlawful  entity WestNET. The Office of National Drug Control Policy is the  executive branch responsible for the conspiracy to “summarily”  destroy medical marijuana without statutory or constitutional due  process. Matthew George Whitaker, the U.S. Department of Justice,  Jeffery Felten-Green, the Bureau of Justice Assistance office of programs, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, is a “person,”  as that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO. 

20 

WestNET is an “enterprise” as that term is defined pursuant to Section  1961(4) of RICO.  

 The defendants are also numerous John and Jane Does under  O.N.D.C.P., U.S.D.O.J command and control, who took part in the  collection of monies and assets and who; spent said monies obtained  by the sales of said assets for a period of at least 17 years; and seized  medical marijuana without statutory or constitutional due process.  Obtaining the identity of the seizing individual would be unduly  burdensome and impracticable until the law enforcement agencies  comply with the due process requirement to give notice of seizure.  This complaint would proceed against them under the Bivens v. Six  Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). John and Jane Does is  a “person,” as that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO and the other claims herein. WestNET is an “enterprise” as that  term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(4) of RICO.  

 No Amici Curiae was filed at the trial court. 

  1. Ruling Under Review 

 Appellant appeals from the Court of Appeals for the District of  Columbia November 12, 2020 Opinion and Order granting 

21 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Affirmance, and denying the  motion to strike and for sanctions. 

  1. Related Cases. 

 Plaintiff is only aware of a case in U.S. Tax Court 9026-19W  which has similar Evidence and is against the actions of WestNET,  but alleges IRS violations. 

 Respectfully submitted this 23rd Day of November, 2020. 

 BY :/ JOHN WORTHINGTON 

 John Worthington Pro Se  

 4500 SE 2ND PL. 

 Renton WA.98059

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USCA Case #20-5113 Document #1870698 Filed: 11/1212020 Page 1 of 2  

~nit~b ~tntes QIourt of J\ppealz  

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT  

No. 20-5113 September Term, 2021: 19-cv-00081-ABJ  

Filed On: November 12, 2020  

John Worthington,  

Appellant  

United States Office of National Drug Control  

Policy, et al.,  

Appellees  

BEFORE: Millett, Pillard , and Rao, Circuit Judges  

ORDER  

Upon consideration of appellant’s brief and the supplements thereto; the motion for  appointment of counsel; the motion for summary affirmance, the opposition thereto, and the  reply; and the motion to strike and for sanctions, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is  

ORDERED that the motion for appointment of counsel be denied. In civil cases,  appellants are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated any  likelihood of success on the merits. It is  

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to strike and for sanctions be denied, It is  

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The  merits of the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers  Watchdog , Inc. v. Stanley, 819 E,2d 294 297 (D.C, Cir, 1987) (per ~uriam).  

The district court correctly concfuded that appellant’s claims are barred by either  sovereign immunity, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 US. 471 475 (1994), or the statute of  limitations , see 28 U.S C. § 24Q1(a), The district court further correctly concluded that  appellant did not show that equitable tolling was warranted, see Jackson v. Modly, 949 E.3d  763 778 (D.C, Cir. 2020}, or that he was entiUed to prospective equitable relief, see NB ex  

reI. Peacock v. District of Columbia, 682 F 3d n, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  

In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s  motion for reconsideration, Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 E 3d 661.671 (D.C, Cir. 2004), or his  

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,,15.. Sf~ #~ ‘I -\ 

JEtltit.eb ~tatc5 ([ourt of j\pp.eaI5  

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT  

No. 20-5113   September Term, 2020  

motion for recusal, see SEC v, Loving Spirit Found, Inc, 392 F 3d 486 493 (D,C, Cir.  2004): see also Litekyv, United States, 510 U,S, 540, 555 (1994),  

Pursuan’l :to D,C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published The Clerk is  directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any  timely petition for rehearing ur petition for rehearing en bane, See Fed R. App P 411 (b);  D.C, Cir. Rule 41,.  

Per Curiam  

FOR THE COURT:  

Mark J, Langer, Clerk  

BY:   /s/  

Manuel J , Castro  

Deputy Clerk  

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