Written by James George Jatras<\/p>\n
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Among realists who don\u2019t accept the\u00a0Kiew siegt an allen Fronten!<\/i>\u00a0narrative it is widely assumed that Russia will soon begin, perhaps in dramatic and decisive fashion, a winter offensive. This would come just as Kiev is hitting \u201cempty\u201d on all key manpower and materiel indicators, exacerbated by the Zelensky regime\u2019s continued insistence on squandering them on strategically meaningless attacks on hardened Russian positions.<\/p>\n
The assumption of a bold Russian shift to the offensive may not be valid, though, as it\u2019s clear that among Moscow\u2019s primary intentions is to avoid triggering a direct clash with NATO forces, which, they reasonably believe, could escalate uncontrollably to the strategic nuclear level. (That\u2019s why it appears Moscow has abandoned its longstanding no-first-use nuclear doctrine for launch-on-warning\u00a0See: Paul Craig Roberts:\u00a0A Hair Trigger on Endgame \u2013 LewRockwell<\/a>)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n So instead of taking decisive action, Moscow may prefer to incrementally escalate the \u201cslow grind\u201d chewing up Kiev\u2019s forces, while continuing to dismantle Ukraine\u2019s infrastructure, which also contributes to accelerating depopulation of Ukraine as cities and towns become uninhabitable. (As Moon of Alabama suggests: \u201cIt does not look like an imminent all out attack on the Ukrainian front lines is in the cards. The expected large winter attack may not be coming at all. Instead the new forces will rotate through the frontline and only attack locally whenever they see an opportunity.\u201d\u00a0MoA \u2013 Ukraine SitRep \u2013 Catastrophic Losses, Failing Wonder Weapons, NATO Escalation (moonofalabama.org)<\/a>\u00a0)<\/p>\n The key question, though, is this:\u00a0Is the slow grind (versus dramatic and decisive knockout)\u00a0less\u00a0likely to cause uncontrollable escalation, or does it\u00a0invite\u00a0it?<\/p>\n Mike Whitney suggests that NATO (i.e., the US) wants to bait Moscow into an action that would justify direct introduction of NATO (or \u201cCoalition of the Willing\u201d) forces.\u00a0(See Whitney:\u00a0Putin Shrugs-Off Washington\u2019s Provocations and \u2018Sticks to Business\u2019, by Mike Whitney \u2013 The Unz Review<\/a>)\u00a0Accordingly, Moscow wisely (in Whitney\u2019s view) is avoiding anything that could be a tripwire. (It\u2019s fair to ask, though: if NATO\/CotW is so keen on getting in, why do they need a pretext from Moscow? One can always be invented from whole cloth. Ask Iraq, Serbia, Syria\u2026 )<\/p>\n Paul Craig Roberts, on the other hand, suggests that Russian restraint sends the exact opposite message: that Moscow will tolerate provocation after provocation, escalation after escalation, which itself invites the very outcome Moscow seeks to avoid.\u00a0(See Roberts:\u00a0The Prospect of Nuclear War Is Getting too Close for Comfort \u2013 LewRockwell<\/a>):<\/p>\n \u201cA Russian official has charged that the CIA and NSA were involved in the attack by drones deep inside Russia. So here we see the total validity of my warnings that Putin\u2019s Goody Two Shoes behavior invites more and more reckless provocations. It is the inability of Putin to understand that Russia is at war with Ukraine and the US\/NATO and that his \u201climited military operation\u201d is nothing but his own delusion that is leading to nuclear war.<\/p>\n \u201cThe United States government has now attacked Russia twice, not counting the attacks on the former Russian territory Russia has reincorporated, such as\u00a0this<\/a>. The attack on the Nord Stream pipelines and now\u00a0drone attacks deep inside Russia<\/a>\u00a0are beyond Ukraine\u2019s unassisted capability. Washington feels comfortable in these reckless acts, because Washington has dismissed Putin\u2019s declared, but never defended, \u2018red lines\u2019 as meaningless.<\/p>\n \u201cOne wonders what is wrong with Putin and with the Kremlin in general that Russia forever complains but never acts. It should be self evident to the Kremlin that the longer the conflict and anti-Russian propaganda continue, the harder for the West to bow out. Prestige and predictions are at risk. a network of relationships develops. Powerful interest groups such as armaments corporations acquire stake in the conflict. With Ukraine facing defeat, there will be agitation for committing US and European soldiers. At first the claim will be that only one division is needed to bolster Ukraine at this or that point. Then to save that division another will be needed. We saw it all in Vietnam.<\/p>\n \u201cWill Putin finally realize that Russia is at war when Moscow goes up in smoke?<\/p>\n \u201cThat would be a bit too late. Putin now admits that he waited too late to intervene in Ukraine, thus giving Washington time to build a Ukrainian military force. So why wait too late again? Can Putin learn from his mistakes? My fear is that Putin is unrealistic and does not comprehend the likely consequences of his Goody Two Shoes behavior. Putin\u2019s restrained behavior gives the green light to greater provocations from Washington. These provocations are accelerating. Russia needs to use the force necessary to quickly end the war before it spins out of control.\u201d<\/p>\n Such concerns are bolstered by Putin\u2019s recent comments on former German Chancellor Angela Merkel\u2019s recent confession that she deliberately deceived the Russians over Minsk 2. Putin just\u00a0now\u00a0figured that out?\u00a0One has to ask: if he still harbored illusions regarding his western \u201cpartners,\u201d has he even now woken up and smelled the\u00a0kvass? Does he still, even now, think he\u2019s dealing with people who can be reasoned with? (Regarding Putin\u2019s admission that more decisive action in 2014 might have been appropriate, militarily, the advantage would have been very much in Moscow\u2019s favor. Whether Russia could at that time have withstood the sanctions she is weathering in good form now is another question.)<\/p>\n Indeed, it has been suggested to me (in a private email) that Moscow is still entertaining illusions, despite all the evidence to the contrary:<\/p>\n \u201cI completely agree with your argument. I said the same thing a couple of years ago when I wrote that Putin should have taken a page from Khrushchev\u2019s playbook and threatened \u2018We will bury you,\u2019\u00a0pounded his shoe on a desk, etc.\u201d<\/p>\n This civilized, decent Putin is an open invitation to NATO\/US to escalate straight to and across the nuclear red line.\u00a0But is anyone listening in the Kremlin?<\/p>\n Conversely, another correspondent suggests that Russian restraint is deliberate, focused on a long game toward Europe, especially Germany (lightly edited):<\/p>\n \u201cI too agree that the slow grind will persist. Russia needs to demonstrate to the EU (Germany specifically) that despite having incredible military strength Russia is judicious in the application of that military strength and respects international law \u2013 all of this in contrast to the USA. The reason for this is that Russia is waiting for the ongoing economic troubles in the EU to create regime change in EU states, to regimes which reconcile with Russia and distance themselves from the US. Russia\u2019s larger strategic goal is to facilitate the liberation of Europe from US control, and that can only come by indigenous regime change. Russia\u2019s displays of its military technology also signals to Europe that only Russia, not the US, can provide strategic defense for them. The slow grind, as Colonel Doug Macgregor stated in his interview by Michael Vlahos, is an excellent way to de-militarize Ukraine without having long supply-lines or maneuvering outside Anti-Access\/Area Denial\u00a0operational zones.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Bottom line: what Moscow does next will not only determine the course of the war in Ukraine but whether the world goes up in radioactive smoke. Does restraint and non-response to provocation make the apocalyptic scenario\u00a0more\u00a0likely, or\u00a0less? Conversely, would a rapid, decisive move by Moscow widen that window or help close it?<\/p>\n Finally, which course is Moscow likely to take? (My guess: the slow grind, nothing dramatic.) Whether that\u2019s the right move, we will soon find out.<\/p>\n