by Paul Collin<\/p>\n
HIGHLIGHT: America Voting Security Secrets, additionally include, the greater \u2018Glitch\u2019: Dominion Voting Systems Inc. \u201918 Patents\u2019 and \u2018Intellectual Property Rights\u2019 exchanged on September 25, 2019 for Collateral from HongKong Shanghai Banking Corporation ( People\u2019s Republic of China ), Patent Numbers, Descriptions, Collateral Security Agreement plus more within The UPI Guy report<\/em>\u00a0( Below ).<\/em><\/p>\n Dominion Voting Systems Patents Given In 2019 To China Bank For Collateral<\/strong><\/p>\n by, Paul Collin ( The UPI Guy )<\/p>\n WASHINGTON, D.C. \u2013 November 13, 2020 \u2013 It is believed that during a December 1923 meeting, of Russia\u2019s Politburo surrounding local party organization votings as-to the platform attitude of L. Trotsky, the following pronouncement was issued by Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin:<\/p>\n \u201cYou know, comrades, what do I think about this: I believe that it does not matter at all who and how will vote in the party; but what is extremely important is who and how will count the votes.\u201d<\/p>\n [ In RUSSIAN: \u201cVy znayete, tovarishchi, chto ya dumayu ob etom: ya schitayu, chto sovershenno nevazhno, kto i kak budet golosovat\u2019 v partii; no chto chrezvychayno vazhno, kto i kak budet podschityvat\u2019 golosa.\u201d \/ In CYRILLIC: \u201c\u0412\u044b \u0437\u043d\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0435, \u0442\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0449\u0438, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u044f \u0434\u0443\u043c\u0430\u044e \u043e\u0431 \u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c: \u044f \u0441\u0447\u0438\u0442\u0430\u044e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0441\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e \u043d\u0435\u0432\u0430\u0436\u043d\u043e, \u043a\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u0433\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0438; \u043d\u043e \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0447\u0440\u0435\u0437\u0432\u044b\u0447\u0430\u0439\u043d\u043e \u0432\u0430\u0436\u043d\u043e, \u043a\u0442\u043e \u0438 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0433\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0441\u0430.\u201d ]<\/p>\n Others, however, claim the aforementioned statements or variations thereof were were pronounced in 1934 amidst procedures for electing the General Secretary of the CPSU at the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks during the 17th Congress.<\/p>\n Reference \u2013<\/p>\n Live Journal ( \u2018You Won The Election, And I Won The Vote Count\u2019 by, Ann Beaker, November 6, 2020, 07:46 a.m. ):\u00a0ru.citaty.net\/tsitaty\/474546-iosif-vissarionovich-stalin-nevazhno-kak-progolosovali-vazhno-kak-podschital\/<\/a><\/p>\n Secrets Of Electronic Voting Manipulations And CounterMeasures \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n While speculations abound as-to relatively similar age-old adages attributable to yet other people surrounding the manipulation of votes cast by populations worldwide, even more important information has surfaced.<\/p>\n For more than the past decade, a plethora of questions surround \u2018high-technology\u2019 issues in-to \u2018voting manipulations\u2019 ( counterfeiting, liquid chemical matrix compound copying, fraudulent templating, etc. ), \u2018security countermeasure features\u2019 and \u2018anti-security counter-countermeasure features\u2019 having remained hidden from public view; a few of which, are now briefly outlined within the following list ( immediately below ):<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Ballot Machines;<\/p>\n \u2013 Electronic Programmable Read Only Memory ( EPROM ) integrated circuit ( I-C ) \u2018chips\u2019 ( plugged in-to an electronic circuit board or soldered into a plug-in module;<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Ballot Light Sensitive Paper;<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Ballot Embedded Magnetic Media Paper;<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Ballot Optical Character Recognition ( OCR ) BarCode Imagery Paper;<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Ballot Embedded WaterMark Imagery Paper;<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Ballot Printing Chemical Matrix Compound Inks;<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting Management Systems; and,<\/p>\n \u2013 Voting TeleCommunication Networks;<\/p>\n Much further below, this report provides details into some of the majority of the aforementioned items, which will be quite amazing to most people.<\/p>\n Communist People\u2019s Republic of China Financially Captured Collateral Of America\u2019s Dominion Voting Systems, Machines And Security Software Application Holdings \u2013<\/p>\n The information source of origination came well-documented from the U.S. federal government as mentioned by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ( USPTO ), and elsewhere, including:<\/p>\n The proprietary Original Equipment Manufacturer ( OEM ) DOMINION VOTING SYSTEM INCORPORATED ( DVS ) financial collateral owner ( in CANADA ) was HSBC interalia interalia the HONGKONG SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION of CHINA that was \u2018officially assigned eighteen ( 18 ) different Patents\u2019 listed within one ( 1 ) Patent Assignment\u2019 on September 25, 2019 that belonged to DOMINION VOTING SYSTEM INCORPORATED ( DVS ).<\/p>\n The \u2018Security Agreement\u2019 pertaining to all Intellectual Property Rights pursuant to those 18 Patents listed in \u2018Schedule A\u2019 was signed by, Michael McGee, Authorized Signor on behalf of DOMINION VOTING SYSTEM INCORPORATED ( DVS ).<\/p>\n Pertinent Patent Numbers \u2013<\/p>\n 8844813<\/p>\n 8913787<\/p>\n 9202113<\/p>\n 8195505<\/p>\n 9870666<\/p>\n 9710988<\/p>\n 9870667<\/p>\n 7111782<\/p>\n 7422151<\/p>\n D599131<\/p>\n D521050<\/p>\n D515619<\/p>\n D521051<\/p>\n D537469<\/p>\n 8714450<\/p>\n 8910865<\/p>\n 8864026<\/p>\n 8876002<\/p>\n References \u2013<\/p>\n legacy-assignments.uspto.gov\/assignments\/assignment-pat-50500-236.pdf<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n assignment.uspto.gov\/patent\/index.html#\/patent\/search\/resultAssignment?id=50500-236<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n DOMINION VOTING SYSTEM INCORPORATED Patent Assignment to HSBC ( U.S. Patent Office, Assignments ):\u00a0assignment.uspto.gov\/patent\/index.html#\/patent\/search\/resultAssignee?assigneeName=HSBC BANK CANADA, AS COLLATERAL AGENT<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n U.S. Patent 8, 910, 865 B2 \u2013 Ballot level security features for optical scan voting machine capable of ballot image processing, secure ballot printing, and ballot layout authentication and verification ( See, e.g.\u00a0patents.google.com\/patent\/US8910865B2\/en?assignee=\u201dDominion+Voting\u201d&oq=\u201dDominion+Voting\u201d<\/a><\/p>\n Research References ( Relative ) \u2013<\/p>\n \u2018Stolen Election: Ongoing Links To Evidence\u2019 by, Kerry Cassidy ( Project Camelot ):\u00a0projectcamelotportal.com\/2020\/11\/05\/the-sting\/<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n \u2018Election Fraud\u2019 by, Kerry Cassidy of Project Camelot ( Twitter ):\u00a0mobile.twitter.com\/projectcamelot\/status\/1325829750976249856<\/a><\/p>\n U.S. Footprint Of Dominion Voting Systems Incorporated \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n Actively deployed throughout America\u2019s states wherein a plethora of voting districts in precincts Dominion Voting Systems Incorporated \u2018hardware\u2019 equipment with \u2018software\u2019 applications exist within what is referred to as its \u201cUnited States Footprint.\u201d<\/p>\n More information as-to DOMINION and other voting processings becomes even more apparent ( See Further Below ).<\/p>\n Basic History Of Dominion Voting Systems Incorporated \u2013<\/p>\n \u2013 DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS INCORPORATED [ 1201 18th Street, Suite 210, Denver, Colorado 80303 USA ] ( also known as );<\/p>\n \u2013 DOMINION VOTING SOLUTIONS ( also known as ); and,<\/p>\n \u2013 DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS CORPORATION [ 20 Mowat Avenue, Suite 100, Toronto, Ontario M6K 3EB, CANADA ].<\/p>\n DOMINION VOTING SOLUTIONS was founded in 2002 in Toronto, Canada by John Poulos and James Hoover. DOMINION VOTING SOLUTIONS INCORPORATED [ of Denver, Colorado is 1 of the 3 voting machine companies used in American Presidential Elections ] purchased PREMIER ELECTION SOLUTIONS from a company named ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE L.L.C. [ ES&S of Omaha, Nebraska is another 1 of the 3 voting machine companies used within American Presidential Elections ] during May, 2010 plus, SEQUOIA VOTING SYSTEMS INCORPORATED ( of Oakland, California ) in June, 2010. After DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS INC. acquired those voting machine companies, it relocated away-from Toronto, Canada to Denver, Colorado in America. Both SEQUOIA and PREMIER voting equipment firms are known as original equipment manufacturers ( OEM ).<\/p>\n As only a point of reference, the third ( 3rd ) voting system machine manufacturer ( used in American Presidential Elections ), is HART INTERCIVIC INCORPORATED ( of Austin, Texas ).<\/p>\n References \u2013<\/p>\n patents.google.com\/patent\/US7111782<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n www.dominionvoting.com\/about\/<\/a><\/p>\n Interestingly enough, all three ( 3 ) of the voting machine manufacturers and private equity firms ( e.g. H.I.G. CAPITAL L.L.C., STAPLE STREET CAPITAL GROUP L.L.C., MCCARTHY GROUP L.L.C., et. al. ) that own the major election equipment and software manufacturers ( used by 90% of the American voting public nationwide ), that came under investigations into information surrounding security, oversight, finances and ownership ( foreign and domestic ).<\/p>\n References \u2013<\/p>\n www.documentcloud.org\/documents\/6588498-Senators-Letters-to-Private-Equity-1.html<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n www.nbcnews.com\/news\/all\/chinese-parts-hidden-ownership-growing-scrutiny-inside-america-s-biggest-n1104516<\/a><\/p>\n Voting Security Feature Secrets \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n Not many people are fully aware of the extent by which multiple types of security features are served-up for every voting paper ballot used by Americans.<\/p>\n The following information was obtained from the United States Patent Office and excerpted ( below ) as-to some of those security features.<\/p>\n \u201c\u2026 [ The ] plurality of security features embedded in the printer stock and \/ or printed on the ballot, during the process of printing official ballots.<\/p>\n In the case where the security features include plain or encrypted data, the optical scanner is capable of interpreting the data and verifying it.<\/p>\n Further, if the security features printed on the ballot include a pre-assigned ballot serial number, the optical scanner will be able to verify that the serial number present is authorized for that election and has not already been processed.<\/p>\n The features specifically mentioned above can include but are not limited to:<\/p>\n UltraViolet ( UV ) Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n These are features that are \u2018invisible\u2019 when viewed under \u2018Normal White Light\u2019\u00a0but \u2018become visible when \u2018illuminated\u2019 by Ultra-Violet Light\u2019 sources \u2026 [ and can also possess ] features that \u2018absorb Ultra-Violet Light\u2019; typically, these are [ \u2018specially formulated chemical matrix properties within ] \u2018inks\u2019.<\/p>\n InfraRed ( IR ) Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n These are features that are invisible when viewed under normal white light but become visible when illuminated by Infra-red light sources. They can also be features that absorb infra-red light. Typically these are \u2018inks\u2019.<\/p>\n Magnetic Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n These are features that have specific magnetic properties; typically, strips of \u2018magnetic material embedded in the paper\u2019 however, there are \u2018magnetic inks\u2019 also available.<\/p>\n The magnetic properties can be \u2018simple\u00a0\u2013 such as a uniform magnetic property \u2013 or \u2018complex\u2019, such as \u2018a strip of material that has varying magnetic intensities along it\u2019 that can represent a \u2018pattern\u2019 or \u2018data\u2019.<\/p>\n Fluorescent Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n These are features that may be visible or invisible when viewed under \u2018normal white light\u2019 and \u2018fluorescent light\u2019 with \u2018an expected intensity range\u2019 \u2013 when illuminated \u2013 by certain \u2018frequencies of light\u2019 [ lightwave frequencies ]; typically, these are \u2018inks\u2019.<\/p>\n Ink ( Visible ) Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n These particular security features consist of \u2018very unique visible marks\u2019 easily detectable under \u2018normal light\u2019 conditions.<\/p>\n Ink ( Invisible ) Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n These particular security features consist of \u2018invisible chemical formula matrix markers\u2019 only detectable using \u2018highly specific laboratory methodology equipment\u2019 determining whether a voting ballot paper ink ( itself ) is \u2018official\u2019 or \u2018fraudulent\u2019.<\/p>\n Watermark Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n Watermarks are typically \u2018physical features\u2019 which are \u2018imprinted into the paper\u2019, either by \u2019embedding the layers within the paper\u2019 or by being \u2019embossed into the paper\u2019.<\/p>\n They are typically visible in normal white light but \u2018can not be replicated by printing techniques\u2019.<\/p>\n Watermarks can also, possess:<\/p>\n \u2013 UltraViolet Light Features;<\/p>\n \u2013 InfraRed Light Features;<\/p>\n \u2013 Fluorescent Light Features; or,<\/p>\n \u2013 Magnetic Features.<\/p>\n A number of security features can be used in conjunction with each other to further improve security, and make forging or copying ballots even more difficult.<\/p>\n \u2026 Scanners ( Detectors ) \u2026 are capable of detecting and reading the expected security features on the ballot.<\/p>\n Such detectors are known to be used in [ financial] currency authenticating apparatus.<\/p>\n The definition of \u2018which security features to look for\u2019, will form part of the ballot definition for the voting unit so, that the \u2018security features\u2019 can be:<\/p>\n \u2013 \u2018Varied\u2019 between \u2018Jurisdictions\u2019;<\/p>\n \u2013\u00a0[ Varied between ] \u2018Elections\u2019; and even,<\/p>\n \u2013 [ Varied between ] \u2018Precincts\u2019.<\/p>\n That is, \u2018a set of security features can be assigned to the ballots\u2019 of each Precinct, Jurisdiction, Election, etc., and the \u2018members of the set\u2019 can be:<\/p>\n \u2013 \u2018Changed\u2019 for \u2018different Precincts\u2019;<\/p>\n \u2013 [ Changed for \u2018different ] Jurisdictions; and,<\/p>\n \u2013 [ Changed for \u2018different ] Elections\u2019, etc.<\/p>\n One example of a \u2018combined set of security features\u2019 would be the existence of:<\/p>\n \u2013 Ultra-Violet ( U-V ) Fluorescent Light Features, alternating with Infra-Red Light Features \u2018pre-printed on the ballot\u2019.<\/p>\n These features would be detected with both a U-V sensitive and I-R sensitive sensor on the voting unit.<\/p>\n These could also be combined with a human detectable Watermark.<\/p>\n This Watermark can also be detected and processed by the optical scanner provided in the voting unit.<\/p>\n The \u2018security features\u2019 ( described above ) can be used, such-that they are grouped into \u2018three [ 3 ] basic [ Security Feature ] groups\u2019:<\/p>\n \u2013 Static [ Security Feature ];<\/p>\n \u2013 Dynamic [ Security Feature ]; and,<\/p>\n \u2013 Data [ Security Feature ].<\/p>\n Almost all of the types of [ Security ] Features ( Ultra-Violet, Infra-Red, Magnetic, etc. ) \u2018could belong to any of the groupings\u2019 depending on \u2018implementation\u2019 of the \u2018specific security features\u2019.<\/p>\n Paper Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n The group of Static [ Security ] Features refers to the situation, where the:<\/p>\n \u2013 [ Security ] feature is placed [ within ] in the \u2018paper stock\u2019, and is looked for [ optically scanned ] by the voting unit.<\/p>\n These Static [ Security ] Features \u2018do not contain data\u2019, and thus the Security Features solely consist of the \u2018Presence of the [ Security ] Feature\u2019 or the \u2018Absence of the Security Feature\u2019.<\/p>\n Typically, Static [ Security ] Features can ( for example ) consist of a \u2018Mark\u2019 [ within ] in a \u2018set Position\u2019 or [ set ] Area\u2019 on the ballot, such that the \u201dPositioning\u2019 \u2013 of the Static [ Security ] Feature \u2013 does not change.<\/p>\n Typically, [ Security ] Features are \u2018Static\u2019 because they are \u2018expensive to alter\u2019.<\/p>\n For example, \u2019embedding magnetic strips\u2019 [ within ] in \u2018paper stock\u2019 is a \u2018relatively expensive process\u2019.<\/p>\n Therefore, it is likely that \u2018such [ Static Security ] features\u2019 will be \u2018incorporated in a large volume of [ paper ] stock\u2019 \u2013 at one [ 1 ] time \u2013 and not altered frequently; if, at all.<\/p>\n Other Static [ Security ] Features may be selected because of the particular process that is used to create them.<\/p>\n For example, a simple \u2018Ink\u2019 ( such as Ultra-Violet or Infra-Red ) [ Security ] Feature could be \u2018applied during the paper stock manufacture process\u2019 via a [ print ] \u2018roller\u2019 or [ printing ] \u2018brush\u2019.<\/p>\n Such an application is relatively difficult to alter so, again would be applied to large batches.<\/p>\n Watermarks are another example of a security feature that is normally Static.<\/p>\n Dynamic [ Security ] Features refer to \u2018features that can be varied\u2019, either in Position, Size, Shape or Content.<\/p>\n Typically, [ Security ] Features that are relatively cheap and easy to vary will be used as Dynamic Security Features.<\/p>\n For example, a [ Security ] Feature which is somehow \u2018Printed onto the [ Paper ] stock during the manufacture process, such as a \u2018Secure Ink Feature ( using Ultra-Violet sensitive or Infra-Red sensitive ) is often a Dynamic [ Security ] Feature.<\/p>\n As it [ Paper ] is printed, at the time of manufacture [ manufacturing ], the \u2018Position\u2019, \u2018Shape\u2019 and \u2018Other Properties\u2019 could be [ for \u2018security reasons\u2019 ] \u2018Altered\u2019 for \u2018different batches\u2019 of \u2018paper stock\u2019.<\/p>\n Therefore, the Dynamic Security Features can easily be \u2018Varied for different Elections\u2019, [ \u2018Varied\u2019 or different \u2018Jurisdictions\u2019, or even [ \u2018Varied\u2019 for different Precincts ] \u2018Districts\u2019 to \u2018provide added security\u2019 and \u2018prevent counterfeiting of ballots\u2019.<\/p>\n Further, the voting unit can be \u2018programmed to detect\u2019 the:<\/p>\n \u2013 \u2018Specific [ Security ] Feature expected\u2019 [ for the given \u2018Election\u2019 and \u2018Jurisdiction\u2019 ];<\/p>\n \u2013 [ \u2018Specific Security ] Shape expected\u2019 [ for the given \u2018Election\u2019 and \u2018Jurisdiction\u2019 ]; and \/ or,<\/p>\n \u2013 [ \u2018Specific Security ] Location expected\u2019 for the given \u2018Election\u2019 and \u2018Jurisdiction\u2019.<\/p>\n \u2018Data [ Security ] Features\u2019 are a special group of \u2018Dynamic [ Security ] Features\u2019.<\/p>\n They contain \u2018data that can be read\u2019 and [ \u2018data that can be ] verified\u2019 by ( for example ) the scanner of voting unit.<\/p>\n Typically, the data will be represented in a feature such as a 1-D [ single dimensional ] or 2-D [ dual dimensional ] [ Security ] \u2018bar code\u2019.<\/p>\n While the data could be anything, it is preferably a \u2018security code\u2019 that can be \u2018validated\u2019.<\/p>\n This data can be easily varied for different Elections, Jurisdictions, or even [ Precincts ] Districts.<\/p>\n To \u2018further increase the security of the code\u2019, the \u2018data can be encrypted\u2019 using a \u2018pre-agreed private-public key pair\u2019.<\/p>\n Thus, even if a potential forger managed to create some Paper, with the necessary [ Security ] Feature technology ( for example UltraViolet Ink ) and could \u2018reproduce the type of [ Security ] Feature ( e.g. a, barcode ), \u2018the forger would have to know the correct security code representing that Election\u2019.<\/p>\n If the \u2018barcodes are encrypted\u2019, a scheme can be utilized that would require \u2018the forger to also have the public and private keys generated by the Jurisdiction\u2019.<\/p>\n Printed [ Security ] Features, such as those using UltraViolet Ink, InfraRed Ink, Fluorescence Ink, or Magnetic Ink \u2018could additionally be applied to each ballot\u2019 \u2013 by the ballot [ Paper ] Printer ( e.g. the printer used to print a paper ballot such as the paper ballot shown in Figure 5 ).<\/p>\n This represents a \u2018different type of security\u2019 as the \u2018Source\u2019 of the Security Feature is not controlled; however, the content is [ controlled] and \u2018can be varied\u2019 \u2013 at a much lower level of granularity.<\/p>\n For example each [ Paper ] ballot style could have a \u2018Printed Security Feature\u2019 that has an \u2018Encrypted Code\u2019 representing the [ \u2018Specific ] Election\u2019 and \u2018Ballot Style\u2019 along with the [ Voting ] Precincts [ Voting Districts ] in \u2018which they are valid\u2019.<\/p>\n These Security Features could then be detected and verified by the scanner of the voting unit.<\/p>\n This improvement gives a \u2018very fine level of control and security\u2019 to the [ Paper ] ballot \u2018Authentication process\u2019.<\/p>\n The Security Features may also be \u2018masked by each other\u2019.<\/p>\n For example, a [ Security ] Feature that is Printed using normal visible \u2018Ink\u2019 could have a different UltraViolet or InfraRed [ Security ] Feature printed on top of it.<\/p>\n Further, if \u2018Paper stock\u2019 and\u00a0ballot Printer\u2019 [ Security ] Features are \u2018combined\u2019, it becomes \u2018virtually impossible\u2019 ( and certainly \u2018prohibitively expensive\u2019 ) to try to \u2018copy\u2019 or \u2018forge\u2019 [ Paper ] ballots.<\/p>\n Reference \u2013<\/p>\n patents.google.com\/patent\/US8910865B2\/en?assignee=<\/a>\u201cDominion+Voting\u201d&oq=\u201dDominion+Voting\u201d<\/p>\n Covert Secure Document Registration ( CSDRS) And Automated Authentication Systems ( AAS )<\/p>\n Abstract \u2013<\/p>\n A method for creating a secure document, registering the secure document and verifying the authenticity of the secure document includes receiving a print object that has content.<\/p>\n A security feature, including an identifier, is created and is associated with the content.<\/p>\n The identifier may be a barcode.<\/p>\n The barcode may represent a character string.<\/p>\n The security feature may include the \u2018identifier barcode\u2019 and a \u2018decoy barcode\u2019 that is not associated with the content.<\/p>\n The identifier barcode ( or, \u2018character string\u2019 represented by the barcode ) and the \u2018content\u2019, are \u2018transmitted to a storage database .<\/p>\n Once stored, the \u2018identifier and the content\u2019 are \u2018considered registered\u2019.<\/p>\n A print object, that includes the security feature and the content, is then \u2018transmitted to a printer for printing\u2019.<\/p>\n More \u2026<\/p>\n Research Reference \u2013<\/p>\n patft.uspto.gov\/netacgi\/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-adv.htm&r=6&p=1&f=G&l=50&d=PTXT&S1=<\/a>\u201cdominion+voting+systems\u201d&OS=\u201ddominion+voting+systems\u201d&RS=\u201ddominion+voting+systems\u201d<\/p>\n Methods for Securing Invisible 2D Barcodes and Printed Images<\/p>\n Research Reference \u2013<\/p>\n patents.google.com\/patent\/US10475269B2\/en?assignee=<\/a>\u201cDominion+Voting\u201d&oq=\u201dDominion+Voting\u201d<\/p>\n Dominion Voting Systems Incorporated Ballot Level Security Features \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n For optical scan voting machines capable of ballot image processing, secure ballot printing, ballot layout authentication and verification, such can be found within U.S. Patent 9,202,113 B2 and US8910865B2 \u2013<\/p>\n US 8,910,865 B2 \u2013<\/p>\n December 16, 2014<\/p>\n \u2013 James Hoover<\/p>\n \u2013 Dominion Voting Systems Inc.<\/p>\n Inventors:<\/p>\n \u2013 Eric Coomer ( Broomfield, CO, USA );<\/p>\n \u2013 Larry Korb ( Moraga, CA, USA );<\/p>\n \u2013 Brian Glenn Lierman ( Exeter, CA, USA )<\/p>\n Priority: 2012-05-11<\/p>\n Filed: 2014-11-12<\/p>\n Granted: 2015-12-01<\/p>\n Published: 2015-12-01<\/p>\n Methods, systems, and devices are described for adjudicating votes made on voter-marked paper ballots. Voter-marked paper ballots may be scanned to obtain optical image data of the voter-marked paper ballots. The optical image may be analyzed to determine the votes contained in the ballot for \u2026<\/p>\n Abstract \u2013<\/p>\n A ballot authentication system uses a plurality of security features embedded in and\/or printed on the paper stock used to print a ballot on which election-choice-information is printed and a voting unit that includes at least a scanner that is configured to detect the plurality of security features that are embedded in and\/or printed on the ballot and authenticate the ballot based on the read information. The voting unit of the ballot authentication system can be configured to Verify and confirm that the various security features embedded in and\/or ABSTRACT (51) Int. Cl. printed on the ballot is correct for a particular precinct of an G07C I3\/00 (2006.01) election. The security features of the ballot authentication (52) U.S. Cl. system can include static, dynamic and data security features.<\/p>\n Reference \u2013<\/p>\n patft.uspto.gov\/netacgi\/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=\/netahtml\/PTO\/srchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&d=PALL&s1=8910865.PN.<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n patentimages.storage.googleapis.com\/d1\/cb\/cf\/b28391732edf53\/US8910865.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n America\u2019s general presidential primary election voting process becomes even more complicated once high-technology applicable to security comes into view.<\/p>\n Secret Reprogrammable EPROM Software Illegally Planted Within DIEBOLD Voting Systems Used Across America \u2013<\/strong><\/p>\n In March 2016, having become aware of several issues surrounding America\u2019s \u2018right to vote\u2019 moreover, its \u2018fight to vote\u2019 caused me to perform some research for writing the following report ( Below ); although, 4-years later ( now, 2020 ), most of the clandestine surveillance videos and interviews were erased off-of YouTube.<\/p>\n \u2013<\/p>\n Courtesy: Kentron Intellect Research<\/p>\n U.S. Election Intelligence<\/strong>\u00a0( The Right \/ Fight To Vote )<\/p>\n by, Paul Collin<\/p>\n LOS ANGELES \u2013 April 16, 2016 \u2013 In 2012, reports circulated that an incredibly huge quantity of multiple millions of rounds of ammunition for guns were purchased for use by employees of U.S. Post Offices, Internal Revenue Service, Department of Homeland Security, and multiple other government employees too, which no one could make sense of.<\/p>\n People across America are just now beginning to learn that their Constitutional right to vote is being negatively manipulated away-from millions of American citizens whom are just now beginning to react by nationwide incidents of protests leading to civil disobedience because the people cannot vote for whom they wish to elect as the new U.S. President for 2016.<\/p>\n The following organization is only one ( 1 ) group attempting to demonstrate voter disenfranchisement and displeasure with the clandestine means by which the American people are having their voting rights surreptitiously removed by the U.S. government in not just one ( 1 ) instance but through a number of means subverting the public election process that is not being fully broadcasted over American mainstream news media television or radio.<\/p>\n What Americans have recently learned, is that not only U.S. Presidential candidate Donald J. Trump is objecting, but Ted Cruz, Bernie Sanders, and now even more recently Hillary Rodham Clinton too.<\/p>\n What the candidates are objecting-to, and filing civil court lawsuits over, are \u2018not all that is going wrong\u2019 with the election process in the United States of America, but \u2018only what is negatively impacting them individually\u2019 so, there is a wide disparity of voter problems surfacing of which the American general public only hears little bits and pieces about.<\/p>\n Nothing at all is being broadcasted as to the \u2018high-tech computer glitches\u2019 within \u2018each and every one of the voting tabulation machines\u2019 manufactured by the DIEBOLD CORPORATION that also produces multiple different bank debit and credit card Automatic Teller Machines ( ATM ) too.<\/p>\n Reference<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=6sMqvY_VSPI<\/a><\/p>\n DIEBOLD \u2018sensitive locations\u2019, throughout America, remain a closely guarded U.S. national secret security project supervised in buildings shared by contracts with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and other high-tech services too.<\/p>\n In 2008, I stumbled across such a complex in Charlottesville, Virginia where within a very large one ( 1 ) story sprawling complex that appeared to be abandoned, DIEBOLD existed within along with many other clandestine service companies too.<\/p>\n While DIEBOLD and the C.I.A. have numerous problems, the bottomline is so do \u2018all American voters\u2019 now just before they elect their President this year so, it\u2019s easy to see both \u2018how\u2019 and \u2018why\u2019 nationwide civil unrest will erupt in-lieu of the wanton government subversion over the \u2018voting rights\u2019 of United States citizens.<\/p>\n Here ( below ) is the second ( 2nd ) wave of protests conducted by a group not fully prepared to address \u2018all voting problems\u2019 today:<\/p>\n SOURCE: Colorado Voters Matter ( website )<\/p>\n PROTEST LOCATION: The West Steps of the Colorado State Capitol Building, 200 East Colfax Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, USA.<\/p>\n BRIEF: On April 9th, 2016 three-thousand nine-hundred ( 3,900 ) Republicans inside a closed convention voted in the State of Colorado national caucus selection process. We believe thirty-four ( 34 ) State of Colorado national delegates selected on that day do not accurately represent the people of Colorado.<\/p>\n More \u2026<\/p>\n References<\/p>\n www.coloradovotesmatter.org\/<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.facebook.com\/events\/473567376179762\/<\/a><\/p>\n I have conducted a fair cross-section of \u2018all voting problems in America\u2019, and my \u2018short list of video clips\u2019 consisting of \u2018all\u2019 are now presented for your review:<\/p>\n Research References \u2013<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=woj-klO4Prs<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=FDzMexGSp-k<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=R-xIlBdrODY<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=3xTurBkmqqA<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=ecv5hPBXsmE<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=V7gru2usplY<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=SQR-A-e2r_w<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/channel\/UCvsye7V9psc-APX6wV1twLg<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=x895WbrWkXE<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=KngtvqbWiSw<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n m.youtube.com\/watch?v=V1FCdfK8gTY<\/a>\u00a0&<\/p>\n