{"id":38426,"date":"2020-11-25T11:27:56","date_gmt":"2020-11-25T15:27:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/?p=38426"},"modified":"2020-11-25T11:28:20","modified_gmt":"2020-11-25T15:28:20","slug":"meet-the-judicial-fixer-for-the-deep-state","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/?p=38426","title":{"rendered":"Meet the Judicial Fixer for the Deep State<\/i>."},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
\nFILED REGARDING
\nJUDGE AMY BERMAN JACKSON\u00a0<\/strong><\/span><\/h1>\n
\n

\u00a0<\/span>20-05113\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>_________________\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
\n<\/b>_________________\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>JOHN WORTHINGTON,
\nAPPELLANT,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0v.,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0ONDCP et al\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0APPELLEES.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>___________________\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/b>On Appeal from the United States District Court
\nFor the District of Columbia
\n(No. 1: 19-cv-00081) (Hon. Amy Berman Jackson)\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC<\/b><\/p>\n

\n

\u00a0<\/b>BY: S\/ JOHN WORTHINGTON<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0JOHN WORTHINGTON
\n90 S.RHODEFER RD E-101
\nSEQUIM WA.98382
\n425-919-3910<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>TABLE OF CONTENTS\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..1-3<\/span><\/p>\n

STATEMENT\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20263-8<\/p>\n

REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING EN BANC\u2026\u2026\u2026….8-9\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. <\/b>THE PANEL\u2019S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY\u00a0 OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED\u00a0 <\/span>IN COHEN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES 819 F.3d \u00a0476 (2016), AND TEXAS v. UNITED STATES,\u00a0 798 F.3d 1108 (2015), UPHOLDING RULE 7(b)\u2026…\u2026\u2026.9-11<\/li>\n
  2. THE PANEL\u2019S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY\u00a0 OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED\u00a0 \u00a0<\/span>IN CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. SEC, 137 F.3d\u00a0 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1998) AND PUB. CITIZEN,\u00a0 INC. v. FERC, 839 F 3.d 1165, 1171 (D.C. CIR.2016)……11-12<\/li>\n
  3. THE PANEL\u2019S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY\u00a0 OVERRULED U.S. SUPREME COURT\u00a0 PRECEDENT BASED IN NATIONAL PARK\u00a0 HOSP. ASS\u2019N v. DEP\u2019 OF INTERIOR 538 U.S.\u00a0 803, 808 (2003)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…12-15<\/li>\n
  4. CONCLUSION\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..15<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    I<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>TABLE OF AUTHORITIES\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES<\/b>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. \u00a0 490, 539 (1981)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026.\u2026..14\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 143 (1973)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026..14\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u202613, 15\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0513(2009)…\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..13 Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 576 U.S. (2015)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…..13\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Nat\u2019l Park Hosp. Ass\u2019n v. Dep\u2019t of Interior, 538 U.S. \u00a0 803, 808 (2003)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.12, 13, 15\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., \u00a0 496 U. S. 633, 654 (1990)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026..14\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 201 (1947)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.14\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS FOR D.C. CASES<\/b>. Alpharma, Inc. v Leavitt, 460 F. 3d 1, 5\u20136 (<\/span>D.C. Cir. <\/span>2006)\u2026\u2026..\u202614\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    City of New Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0(D.C. Cir. 1998)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20261, 12 Cohen v. Board of Trustees <\/span>819 F.3d 476 (2016)\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026..\u20261, 9, 11<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Fox v. American Airlines, Inc.,<\/span>389 F.3d 1291, 1294\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0(D.C.Cir.2004)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….2\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1033\u20131034 \u00a0 (D.C. Cir. 1988)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026.\u2026.\u2026.5<\/span><\/p>\n

    II\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS FOR D.C. CASES Cont <\/b>Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1303\u20131304 (D.C. Cir. 1994)\u2026.\u2026.\u2026.5\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Graetz v. District of Columbia Public Schools<\/span>, <\/span><\/i>Civ. A.<\/span>\u00a0 <\/span>\u00a0No. 86-293, 1987 WL 8527, (D.D.C1987)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026.\u2026.5<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Nat\u2019l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep\u2019t of Def., 512 F.3d \u00a0 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2008)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.10, 11\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass\u2019n of America, \u00a0 644 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2011)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026..6\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FERC, 839 F.3d 1165, 1171\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0(D.C. Cir. 2016)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u202612\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Texas v. United States, <\/span>798 F.3d 1108 (2015)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026.1, 9, 10, 11<\/span> Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021 (D.C.Cir.2004)\u2026\u2026.\u2026…2, 11\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    United States v. Best, 961 F.2d 964, 1992 WL 96354, \u00a0 (D.C. Cir. 1992)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026….5-6\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc<\/span>., <\/span><\/i>775 F.3d 425<\/span>, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0428 (D.C.Cir.2014)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026..10, 11<\/span> U.S. DISTRICT COURT CASES<\/b>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries,<\/span> \u00a0<\/span>284 F.Supp.2d 15<\/span>, 25 (D.D.C.2003)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u202610, 11<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    D.D.C. LOCAL RULE<\/b>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    7 (b)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026In Passim 11\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026..5 108(h)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u20265<\/span><\/p>\n

    III\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Federal Appellate rule\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    35 (b)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026…..1 <\/span>Federal Rule of Civil Procedure\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    56(c)\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.5\u00a0 <\/span>Federal codes\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    28 U.S.C. 2401\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026..\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026\u2026.11<\/span><\/p>\n

    IV\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT\u00a0 <\/b>Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, John Worthington expresses a belief, based on studied circuit history of Rule 7 (b), and previous U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District\u00a0 of Columbia rulings <\/span>in, <\/span>Cohen v. Board of Trustees <\/span>819 F.3d 476 <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>(2016), and,<\/span> in Texas v. United States, <\/span>798 F.3d 1108 (2015)<\/span>, that the\u00a0 panel decision is contrary to decisions of the United States Court of\u00a0 Appeals for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Supreme Court\u00a0 cases identified below.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0Worthington also request the full court to accept review because the\u00a0 trial court did not have jurisdiction in an APA case without a final\u00a0 agency action as required by the longstanding United States Court of\u00a0 Appeals for the District of Columbia precedence in City of New\u00a0 Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1998)<\/span>, <\/b>and, the U.S.\u00a0 Supreme Court cases identified below<\/span>.\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/b>The Panel did not adhere to well established precedent established\u00a0 in Rule 7(b), and allowed the United States Department of Justice to\u00a0 get away with not answering legal allegations at the trial court and\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    1\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    also enabled the government attorney to add legal arguments to a motion for summary affirmance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0The panel also allowed U.S. District Court Judge Amy Jackson\u00a0 Berman, to make arguments for the United States Department of\u00a0 Justice in a stark reversal of D.C. Circuit precedent and Rule 7 (b). \u00a0 It is of great public importance to be free of federally funded law\u00a0 enforcement looting mechanism\u2019s and Rico Act revenue generation\u00a0 schemes. Society needs law enforcement accountability now more\u00a0 than ever. The panel had a golden opportunity to do so and failed.\u00a0 The <\/span>\u2018Level playing field\u201d<\/b>1<\/span>provisions of Rule 7 (b), were ignored\u00a0 and judicial canons were violated, when the trial court Judge made\u00a0 arguments for the United States Department of Justice. It is not the\u00a0 function of the District Court judges to make arguments on behalf of the litigants, and save them from <\/span>\u201cdistinct appellate repercussions\u201d <\/b>for <\/span>\u201cbackhanding\u201d <\/b>arguments that should have <\/span>\u201cdoomed\u201d <\/b>their case.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    1 <\/span>D.D.C. Local Rule 7(b). The rule “is a <\/span>docket-management tool <\/b>that facilitates <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>efficient and effective resolution of motions by requiring the prompt joining of <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>issues,” Fox v. American Airlines, Inc.,<\/span>389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2004), and\u00a0 judicious enforcement of the rule “ensures * * * that litigants argue their causes\u00a0 on a <\/span>level playing field<\/b>,” id. at 1295 (quoting English-Speaking Union v.\u00a0 Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021 (D.C.Cir.2004)<\/span><\/p>\n

    2\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>The panel ruling was an obvious radical departure from circuit\u00a0 precedence and Rule 7 (b) and the \u201cdecades\u201d old use of its \u201c<\/span>docket management tool.\u201d<\/b>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    This unprecedented ruling compels the attention of the full Court,\u00a0 because the panel decision conflicts with D.C. Circuit and U.S.\u00a0 Supreme Court precedent and shatters the integrity of the Court of\u00a0 Appeals for the District of Columbia.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>STATEMENT\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/b>John Worthington filed a complex combined complaint over the\u00a0 actions of two multi-jurisdictional drug task forces in Washington\u00a0 State in 2007.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0Worthington alleged the task forces raided him and did not provide\u00a0 a notice of intent to seize his property as is required by law. \u00a0 In addition, Worthington made allegations one of the drug task\u00a0 forces WestNET, was using its non-entity distinction illegally under\u00a0 the Rico Act to collect monies from Worthington and the public. \u00a0 Worthington also challenged the constitutionality of the ongoing Office of National Drug Control Policy and U.S. Department of\u00a0 Justice policy to use state and local law enforcement to seize medical\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    3\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    marijuana \u201csummarily\u201d as contraband without due process of state\u00a0 law, which the drug task forces agreed to operate under.\u00a0 The United States Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss\u00a0 and Worthington responded with 45 pages and over 2000 exhibits in\u00a0 response. The United States Department of Justice filed a three page\u00a0 reply brief and left most of the arguments unaddressed. \u00a0 Rather than enforce circuit precedence and Rule 7 (b), Judge Amy\u00a0 Berman Jackson ignored Rule 7 (b) and made arguments for the\u00a0 United States Department of Justice, and tilted the <\/span>\u201clevel playing\u00a0 field\u201d <\/b>in favor of the United States Department of Justice.\u00a0 Worthington v. ONDCP et al was not played on a <\/span>\u201clevel playing\u00a0 field,\u201d <\/b>and the \u201c<\/span>docket management tool\u201d <\/b>used for <\/span>\u201cdecades\u201d <\/b>in this\u00a0 circuit, was left in the shed. This case was played on Cripple Creek.\u00a0 The Circuit panel in Worthington v. ONDCP et al, consisting in part\u00a0 of Judges Millet and Pillard, both with a long history of being judicial\u00a0 enforcers of the 7(b) \u201c<\/span>docket management tool\u201d <\/b>and protectors of\u00a0 the <\/span>\u201clevel playing field,\u201d <\/b>broke from their previous pattern of enforcement and protection practices, and let the United States\u00a0 Department of Justice escape application of the Rule 7 (b).<\/span><\/p>\n

    4\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>When past litigants Cohen and Texas faced the <\/span>\u201clevel playing\u00a0 field\u201d <\/b>and circuit duo of Judges Millard and Pillett<\/span>2<\/span>, they felt the cold\u00a0 steel application of Rule 7 (b), the \u201c<\/span>docket management tool,\u201d <\/b>and\u00a0 the cold hard surface of the <\/span>\u201clevel playing field.\u201d\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/b>Cohen and Texas were informed this has been happening in this\u00a0 circuit for <\/span>\u201cdecades.\u201d <\/b>Quote: <\/span>\u201cRules are rules, and basic fairness <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>requires that they be applied evenhandedly to all litigants. Rule 7(b) <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>(or its materially identical predecessor, Local Rule 108(b)) has been in <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>force for nearly three decades, see Graetz v. District of Columbia <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Public Schools<\/span>, <\/span><\/i>Civ. A. No. 86-293, 1987 WL 8527, at *1 (D.D.C. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>March 3, 1987).\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0Furthermore, Judge Millet Wrote: <\/span>\u201cWe have repeatedly held,\u00a0 moreover, that a material failure to follow the rules in district court\u00a0 can \u201c<\/span>doom\u201d <\/b>a party\u2019s case. See, e.g., Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300,\u00a0 1303\u20131304 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (\u201cWhen Geller failed to respond, he\u00a0 conceded a violation of Rule 11 under Local Rule 108(b) [Local Rule\u00a0 7(b)\u2019s predecessor]; he cannot now argue the merits of his Rule 11 defense.\u201d); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1033\u20131034\u00a0 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (failure to designate and reference triable facts under\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    2<\/span> The honorable <\/span>Cornelia T.L. Pillard and Patricia A. Millet.<\/span><\/p>\n

    5\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule 108(h) was fatal\u00a0 to appellant\u2019s opposition to motion for summary judgment)\u00a0 Judge Millet wrote further: Texas\u2019s tactical choice in district court\u00a0 has <\/span>\u201c<\/b>distinct appellate repercussions<\/b>\u201d <\/b>as well. We are \u201ca court of\u00a0 review, not one of first view,\u201d United States v. Best, 961 F.2d 964,\u00a0 1992 WL 96354, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (unpublished), so we rarely\u00a0 entertain arguments on appeal that were not first presented to the\u00a0 district court, see, e.g., Pettaway v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass\u2019n of\u00a0 America, 644 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (refusing to consider\u00a0 claim that district court violated a local rule because appellant failed\u00a0 to make that argument before the district court). And \u201c<\/span>we can find no <\/b>\u00a0<\/b>instance when we made an exception\u201d <\/b>to that rule because the\u00a0 party\u2019s chosen strategy of \u201c<\/span>backhanding\u201d <\/b>the issues in district court \u201c<\/span>backfired<\/b>.\u201d\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0Here, the litigant United States Department of Justice did not face\u00a0 the same cold steel application of Rule 7(b), the \u201c<\/span>docket\u00a0 management tool\u201d <\/b>and cold surface of the <\/span>\u201clevel playing field,\u201d <\/b>and escaped accountability for horrible public policy and violations of\u00a0 Rico Act statutes, when its case should have been <\/span>\u201cdoomed.\u201d<\/b><\/p>\n

    6\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>The United States Department of Justice decision to <\/span>\u201cbackhand\u201d <\/b>issues did not <\/span>\u201cbackfire,\u201d <\/b>because Judge Jackson broke precedence to\u00a0 make new arguments not made by the United States Department of\u00a0 Justice and the circuit panel allowed even more new arguments in the\u00a0 contested motion for summary affirmance.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0WestNET should have been stopped from using awful public policy\u00a0 to use federal tax dollars to loot citizens who try and grow medical\u00a0 marijuana should have been halted in 2020.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0WestNET should have been stopped from being used as a legal\u00a0 entity to collect revenue as Rico Act organization.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0A true <\/span>\u201clevel playing field\u201d <\/b>might have stopped violations of law\u00a0 and constitutional rights, but this \u201c<\/span>level playing field<\/b>\u201d in Worthington\u00a0 v. ONDCP et al, tilted too far towards the United States Department\u00a0 of Justice, and Cripple Creek.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0The State of Washington and the U.S. Department of Treasury are\u00a0 running illegal revenue collecting mechanisms through entities which\u00a0 were never meant to function as a legal entity. They have done so\u00a0 knowingly so they could pay for employees and other task force\u00a0 expenditures. They never came close to the \u201c<\/span>level playing field.<\/b>\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    7\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>On more than one level, the federal government had checks and\u00a0 balances to stop WestNET from being used as a legal entity, but the\u00a0 WestNET executive board, comprised of federal, state and local\u00a0 members failed at every level on purpose, so they did not have to go\u00a0 back to component members to get task force funding. \u00a0 Worthington tried to stop this illegal behavior and bad public\u00a0 policy but the D.C. Circuit buried it.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0The <\/span>\u201cdecades old\u201d <\/b>circuit <\/span>\u201cdocket management tool\u201d <\/b>was not\u00a0 applied in Worthington v. ONDCP et al and this case was not\u00a0 conducted on a <\/span>\u201clevel playing field.\u201d <\/b>The United State Department of\u00a0 Justice escaped accountability and now WestNET can continue its\u00a0 Rico Act revenue collection scheme and the public looting policy can\u00a0 continue on Worthington and the public at large.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0This unprecedented ruling compels the attention of the full Court,\u00a0 because it is of public importance and would protect the integrity of\u00a0 this circuit, which assisted this case to the unpublished abyss.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/span>REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING EN BANC\u00a0\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

    \u00a0<\/b>In this case of exceptional importance, the panel improperly\u00a0 overruled Circuit precedent, and severely undermined the integrity of\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    8\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    what many people feel is the second highest court in America.\u00a0 Supreme Court Justices are regularly picked from this circuit. En banc\u00a0 review is necessary to preserve circuit precedence and its nationwide\u00a0 prestige as a court of honor.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0The United States of America should not be funding and\u00a0 participating in Rico Act revenue schemes against the public, and this\u00a0 circuit should not be trying to bury this conduct in an unpublished\u00a0 ruling.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u00a0If there is going to be such a blatant and repugnant departure from circuit precedent, the panel should publish that decision or the full\u00a0 court should inspect the departure from Rule 7 (b), the <\/span>\u201cdocket\u00a0 management tool\u201d <\/b>and protect the <\/span>\u201clevel playing field,\u201d <\/b>this circuit\u00a0 has traditionally maintained.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. THE PANEL\u2019S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY\u00a0 OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED IN COHEN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES <\/b>819 F.3d 476 <\/b><\/b>(2016), AND <\/b>TEXAS v. UNITED STATES, <\/b>798 F.3d <\/b><\/b>1108 (2015), UPHOLDING RULE 7(b).<\/b>\u00a0<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      \u00a0<\/b>This Court\u2019s precedent resolves this case. The United States\u00a0 Department of Justice failed to answer legal arguments presented by\u00a0 Worthington. The Circuit panel in Worthington v. ONDCP et al,\u00a0 consisting of Judges Millet and Pillard, the same judicial enforcers of\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      9\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      Rule 7 (d), the <\/span>\u201cdocket management tool\u201d <\/b>and protectors of the\u00a0 <\/span>\u201clevel playing field\u201d <\/b>in the cases above<\/span>, <\/b>broke from their previous pattern of enforcement and protection practices, and let the United\u00a0 States Department of Justice escape the <\/span>\u201cdocket management tool\u201d <\/b>and <\/span>\u201clevel playing field\u201d <\/b>of Rule 7 (b).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      \u00a0The panel ruling conflicts with previous rulings on <\/span>April 22, 2016, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>in <\/span>Cohen v. Board of Trustees <\/span>819 F.3d 476 (2016), August 18, 2015,<\/span> in Texas v. United States, <\/span>798 F.3d 1108 (2015),( citing Wannall v. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Honeywell, Inc<\/span>., <\/span><\/i>775 F.3d 425<\/span>, 428 (D.C.Cir.2014) (citing Hopkins v. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, <\/span>284 F.Supp.2d 15<\/span>, 25 <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>(D.D.C.2003), <\/span>Union v. Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021(D.C.Cir.2004).\u00a0 A panel of this Court may not abandon Circuit precedent unless a\u00a0 Supreme Court decision \u201c\u2018effectively overrules\u2019\u201d or \u201c\u2018eviscerate[s]\u2019\u201d\u00a0 that precedent. Nat\u2019l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep\u2019t of Def., 512\u00a0 F.3d 677, 684 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      \u00a0The Supreme Court has not overruled or eviscerated Cohen v.\u00a0 Board of Trustees <\/span>819 F.3d 476 (2016), and <\/span>Texas v. United States,\u00a0 <\/span>798 F.3d 1108 (2015).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      \u00a0Here, the panel clearly abandoned the ruling in <\/span>Cohen v. Board of\u00a0 Trustees <\/span>819 F.3d 476 (2016), and <\/span>in Texas v. United States, <\/span>798\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      10\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      F.3d 1108 (2015),( citing Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc<\/span>., <\/span><\/i>775 F.3d 425<\/span>, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>428 (D.C.Cir.2014) (citing Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Global Ministries, <\/span>284 F.Supp.2d 15<\/span>, 25 (D.D.C.2003), <\/span>Union v.\u00a0 Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1021 (D.C.Cir.2004), and the \u201c<\/span>level playing\u00a0 field.\u201d\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

      \u00a0<\/b>This unprecedented ruling compels the attention of the full Court.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. THE PANEL\u2019S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY\u00a0 OVERRULED CIRCUIT PRECEDENT BASED IN\u00a0 CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639\u00a0 (D.C. Cir. 1998) AND PUB. CITIZEN, INC. v. FERC,\u00a0 839 F 3.d 1165, 1171 (D.C. CIR. 2016)\u00a0<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        \u00a0<\/b>This Court\u2019s precedent resolves this case. The United States\u00a0 Department of Justice did not answer Worthington request for a final\u00a0 federal agency action to invoke 28 U.S.C. 2401.Judge Amy Berman\u00a0 Jackson also did not answer that jurisdictional impediment either.\u00a0 Judge Jackson did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling on the federal\u00a0 APA ruling without a final agency action.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0A panel of this Court may not abandon Circuit precedent unless a\u00a0 Supreme Court decision \u201c\u2018effectively overrules\u2019\u201d or \u201c\u2018eviscerate[s]\u2019\u201d\u00a0 that precedent. Nat\u2019l Inst. of Military Justice v. Dep\u2019t of Def., 512\u00a0 F.3d 677, 684 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008)<\/span><\/p>\n

        11\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0<\/span>The Supreme Court has not overruled or eviscerated <\/span>City of New <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Orleans v. SEC, 137 F.3d 638, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1998) or <\/span>Pub. Citizen,\u00a0 Inc. v. FERC, 839 F.3d 1165, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 2016)<\/span>,<\/b> the other circuit <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>rulings enforcing this decades old precedence.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0<\/span>The jurisdictional predicate of final agency action must exist at the <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>time the petition is filed. <\/span>City of New Orleans v. SEC, <\/span>137 F.3d 638<\/span>, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>639 (D.C. Cir. 1998) <\/span>(per curiam).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0Here, the only jurisdiction Judge Jackson possessed was <\/span>\u00a0j<\/span>urisdiction to order a writ to require a final agency action<\/span>3<\/span>, which is <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>what Worthington was requesting. Instead of exercising the only <\/span>\u00a0j<\/span>urisdiction the court had, the court took hypothetical jurisdiction <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>under the federal APA and dismissed the case without a verified final <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>federal agency action. Judge Jackson made a great glove save on the <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u201clevel playing field\u201d <\/b>and Worthington was denied justice.<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        III. THE PANEL\u2019S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY\u00a0 OVERRULED U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT\u00a0 BASED IN NATIONAL PARK HOSP. ASS\u2019N v. DEP\u2019\u00a0 OF INTERIOR 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003).\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

        \u00a0<\/b>The U.S. Supreme Court precedent also resolves this case. Rehearing by the full court is necessary to ensure that this case is\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        consistent with the Supreme Court ruling in Nat\u2019l Park Hosp. Ass\u2019n v.\u00a0 <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        3 <\/span>Worthington made such a request but like most of his arguments, it was ignored\u00a0 by the United States Department of Justice and Judge Jackson.<\/span><\/p>\n

        12\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        Dep\u2019t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003), requiring a final federal\u00a0 agency action under the APA.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0The trial court did not identify a final federal agency action to\u00a0 which jurisdiction could be claimed. The trial court then ignored the\u00a0 requested writ to force a final federal or state final agency action, and\u00a0 improperly took jurisdiction to classify an act committed under state\u00a0 law as a final federal agency action.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \u00a0A court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,\u201d\u00a0 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 513 (2009)\u00a0 (internal quotation marks omitted), but instead to assess only whether\u00a0 the decision was \u201cbased on a consideration of the relevant factors and\u00a0 whether there has been a clear error of judgment,\u201d Citizens to\u00a0 Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 416 (1971).\u00a0 It is a \u201cfoundational principle of administrative law\u201d that judicial\u00a0 review of agency action is limited to \u201cthe grounds that the agency\u00a0 invoked when it took the action.\u201d Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,\u00a0 576 U.S. (2015). If those grounds are inadequate, a court may remand\u00a0 for the agency to do one of two things: First, the agency can offer \u201ca\u00a0 fuller explanation of the agency\u2019s reasoning at the time of the agency\u00a0 action.\u201d Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        13\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. 633, 654 (1990) (emphasis added). See also Alpharma, Inc. v\u00a0 Leavitt, 460 F. 3d 1, 5\u20136 (CADC 2006) (Garland, J.) (permitting an\u00a0 agency to provide an \u201camplified articulation\u201d of a prior \u201cconclusory\u201d\u00a0 observation (internal quotation marks omitted)). This route has\u00a0 important limitations. When an agency\u2019s initial explanation\u00a0 \u201cindicate[s] the determinative reason for the final action taken,\u201d the\u00a0 agency may elaborate later on that reason (or reasons) but may not\u00a0 provide new ones. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U. S. 138, 143 (1973) (per\u00a0 curiam). Alternatively, the agency can \u201cdeal with the problem afresh\u201d\u00a0 by taking new agency action. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,\u00a0 201 (1947) (Chenery II). An agency taking this route is not limited to\u00a0 its prior reasons but must comply with the procedural requirements for\u00a0 new agency action.\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          \u00a0The functional reasons for requiring contemporaneous explanations\u00a0 apply with equal force regardless whether post hoc justifications are\u00a0 raised in court by those appearing on behalf of the agency or by\u00a0 agency officials themselves. See American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc.\u00a0 v. Donovan, 452 U. S. 490, 539 (1981) (\u201c[T]he post hoc\u00a0 rationalizations of the agency . . . cannot serve as a sufficient\u00a0 predicate for agency action.\u201d); Overton Park, 401 U. S., at 419\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          14\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          (rejecting \u201clitigation affidavits\u201d from agency officials as \u201cmerely \u2018post\u00a0 hoc\u2019 rationalizations\u201d).\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0Here, neither the United States Department of Justice nor Judge\u00a0 Jackson could take a position for the federal agency in Worthington v.\u00a0 ONDCP et al. Worthington\u2019s APA claims were not under the ambit Of the APA until there was a final federal agency action.\u00a0 The U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Nat\u2019l Park Hosp. Ass\u2019n v. Dep\u2019t\u00a0 of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003), and the other U.S. Supreme\u00a0 Court rulings did not permit jurisdiction without a final agency action\u00a0 and the precedence of that ruling needs to be protected by the full\u00a0 court.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>CONCLUSION\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/b>Worthington respectfully requests the full court to promptly grant\u00a0 rehearing en banc for Worthington v. ONDCP et al..\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0Respectfully submitted this 23<\/span>rd <\/span>day of November 2020.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>BY<\/b>:<\/span>S:\/ JOHN WORTHINGTON<\/b>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/b>JOHN WORTHINGTON\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a090 S.RHODEFER RD E-101\u00a0 SEQUIM WA.9838<\/span><\/p>\n

          15\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE\u00a0 <\/b>I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of\u00a0 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a) (7)(B) because it\u00a0 contains 3733 words according to the count of Microsoft Word. This brief also complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a) (6) because it has been prepared in\u00a0 a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2007, in 14- point Times New Roman font.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>BY: \/\/ JOHN WORTHINGTON<\/b>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/b>John Worthington Pro Se\u00a0 4500 SE 2<\/span>ND <\/span>PL.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0Renton WA.98059\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>425-919-3910<\/span><\/p>\n

          16\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>Certificate of Service\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

          I hereby certify that on the 23rd day of November, 2020, I will mail to\u00a0 the Clerk of Court by U.S. Certified Mail, and then send a\u00a0 notification of such filing to the following by US certified Mail to:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          Johnny Hillary Walker , III\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 2242\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          Washington, DC 20530-0001\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          j<\/span>ohnny.walker@usdoj.gov<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>BY: \/\/ JOHN WORTHINGTON<\/b>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/b>John Worthington Pro Se\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a04500 SE 2<\/span>ND <\/span>PL.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0Renton WA.98059\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>425-919-3910\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          17\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0 <\/span>Judicial Canon 2 A.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0Final Score\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0Hall of Justice league 30 Worthington nil \u00a0 <\/span>ADDENDUM<\/span><\/p>\n

          18\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \u00a0<\/span>CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES. \u00a0 RULINGS UNDER REVIEW, AND RELATED CASES\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

          Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a) (1), Plaintiff-Appellant hereby certifies as follows:\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. Parties and Amici Curiae\u00a0<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            \u00a0<\/b>Plaintiffs-Appellants (\u201cPlaintiff\u201d) is John WorthingtonDefendants Appellees (\u201cDefendants\u201d) are the United States of America, Office of\u00a0 National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), U.S. Department of Justice\u00a0 (U.S.D.O.J.)\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            \u00a0The defendants are also Jovita Carranza and the U.S. Treasury\u00a0 Department, which is in custody of the asset forfeiture account\u00a0 WestNET member agencies agreed to a federal equitable sharing\u00a0 agreement, which contains or has contained, unlawfully obtained\u00a0 debts using the unlawful entity WestNET. The U.S. Treasury\u00a0 Department is the culpable agency for the current and past appointed\u00a0 or assigned treasurer of the equitable asset sharing account under the\u00a0 command and control of O.N.D.C.P., U.S.D.O.J. Jovita Carranza and\u00a0 the U.S. Treasury Department is a “person,” as that term is defined\u00a0 pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO. WestNET is an “enterprise” as\u00a0 that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(4) of RICO.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            19\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            \u00a0<\/span>The defendants are also Matthew George Whitaker, Jeffery Felten Green, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance office of programs, which\u00a0 funded by ONDCP and are under the command and control of the\u00a0 multi-jurisdictional drug task forces TNET WestNET and the DEA.\u00a0 Defendant Whitaker is also in custody of the asset forfeiture and\u00a0 money laundering section, a separate account under the equitable\u00a0 sharing agreement signed by WestNET member entities under the\u00a0 command and control of ONDCP, U.S.D.OJ , which contains or has\u00a0 contained, unlawful revenues collected using the unlawful entity\u00a0 WestNET. The U.S. Department of Justice is the culpable Agency for\u00a0 the current and past elected, appointed or assigned employees who\u00a0 held total control over the existence and finances of the unlawful\u00a0 entity WestNET. The Office of National Drug Control Policy is the\u00a0 executive branch responsible for the conspiracy to “summarily”\u00a0 destroy medical marijuana without statutory or constitutional due\u00a0 process. Matthew George Whitaker, the U.S. Department of Justice,\u00a0 Jeffery Felten-Green, the Bureau of Justice Assistance office of programs, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, is a “person,”\u00a0 as that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            20\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            WestNET is an “enterprise” as that term is defined pursuant to Section\u00a0 1961(4) of RICO.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            \u00a0The defendants are also numerous John and Jane Does under\u00a0 O.N.D.C.P., U.S.D.O.J command and control, who took part in the\u00a0 collection of monies and assets and who; spent said monies obtained\u00a0 by the sales of said assets for a period of at least 17 years; and seized\u00a0 medical marijuana without statutory or constitutional due process.\u00a0 Obtaining the identity of the seizing individual would be unduly\u00a0 burdensome and impracticable until the law enforcement agencies\u00a0 comply with the due process requirement to give notice of seizure.\u00a0 This complaint would proceed against them under the Bivens v. Six\u00a0 Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). John and Jane Does is\u00a0 a “person,” as that term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(3) of RICO and the other claims herein. WestNET is an “enterprise” as that\u00a0 term is defined pursuant to Section 1961(4) of RICO.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            \u00a0No Amici Curiae was filed at the trial court.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

              \n
            1. Ruling Under Review\u00a0<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              \u00a0<\/b>Appellant appeals from the Court of Appeals for the District of\u00a0 Columbia November 12, 2020 Opinion and Order granting\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

              21\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

              Defendants\u2019 Motion for Summary Affirmance, and denying the\u00a0 motion to strike and for sanctions.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \n
              1. Related Cases.\u00a0<\/b><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                \u00a0<\/b>Plaintiff is only aware of a case in U.S. Tax Court <\/span>9026-19W <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>which has similar Evidence and is against the actions of WestNET, <\/span>\u00a0<\/span>but alleges IRS violations.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a0<\/span>Respectfully submitted <\/b>this 23<\/span>rd <\/span>Day of November, 2020.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a0<\/span>BY <\/b>:\/ JOHN WORTHINGTON<\/b>\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n

                \u00a0<\/b>John Worthington Pro Se\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a04500 SE 2<\/span>ND <\/span>PL.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a0Renton WA.98059<\/span><\/p>\n

                22\u00a0<\/span>
                \n<\/span><\/p>\n

                USCA <\/span>Case <\/span>#20-5113 <\/span>Document <\/span>#1870698 <\/span>Filed<\/span>: <\/span>11\/1212020 <\/span>Page 1 <\/span>of <\/span>2\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                ~nit~b <\/span>~tntes <\/span>QIourt <\/span>of <\/span>J\\ppealz\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                FOR <\/span>THE <\/span>DISTRICT <\/span>OF <\/span>COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                No. <\/span>20-5113 <\/span>September Term, <\/span>202<\/b>0\u00a0 <\/b>1: <\/span>19-cv-00081-ABJ\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Filed <\/span>On: <\/span>November <\/span>12, 2020\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                John Worthington,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Appellant\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. <\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  United States <\/span>Office <\/span>of National Drug Control\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Policy, et al<\/span>.<\/span>,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Appellees\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  BEFORE: <\/span>Millett, Pillard <\/span>, <\/span>and Rao, Circuit Judges\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  ORDER\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Upon consideration of appellant’s brief and the supplements thereto; the motion for\u00a0 appointment of counsel; the motion <\/span>for <\/span>summary <\/span>affirmance<\/span>, <\/span>the opposition thereto, and the\u00a0 reply; and the motion to strike and for sanctions, <\/span>the <\/span>oppositi<\/span>o<\/span>n thereto, and the reply, it is\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  ORDERED <\/span>that the motion <\/span>for <\/span>appointment <\/span>of <\/span>counsel be denied. In civil cases,\u00a0 appellants are not entitled to appointment <\/span>of <\/span>counsel when they have not demonstrated any\u00a0 likelihood of <\/span>success <\/span>on the merits. It is\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  FURTHER <\/span>ORDERED <\/span>that the motion to strike and <\/span>for <\/span>sanctions <\/span>be <\/span>denied, It <\/span>is\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  FURTHER <\/span>ORDERED <\/span>that the motion for <\/span>summary <\/span>affirmance be granted. <\/span>The\u00a0 <\/span>merits <\/span>of <\/span>the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant <\/span>summary <\/span>action<\/span>. <\/span>See Taxpayers\u00a0 <\/span>Watchdog <\/span>, <\/span>Inc. <\/span>v<\/span>. <\/span>Stanley<\/span>, <\/span>819 <\/span>E,2d 294 <\/span>297 <\/span>(D.C, Cir, 1987) <\/span>(per <\/span>~uriam).\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  The <\/span>district court correctly concfuded that appellant’s claims <\/span>are <\/span>barred <\/span>by <\/span>either\u00a0 sovereign immunity, <\/span>see <\/span>FDIC <\/span>v<\/span>. <\/span>Meyer, <\/span>510 <\/span>US<\/span>. <\/span>471 <\/span>475 <\/span>(1994)<\/span>, <\/span>or <\/span>the <\/span>statute <\/span>of\u00a0 <\/span>limitatio<\/span>n<\/span>s <\/span>, see <\/span>28 <\/span>U.S <\/span>C<\/span>. <\/span>\u00a7 <\/span>24Q1(a)<\/span>, <\/span>The <\/span>district court further correct<\/span>l<\/span>y concluded that\u00a0 appella<\/span>n<\/span>t <\/span>did <\/span>not <\/span>show <\/span>that <\/span>equitable tolling was warranted, <\/span>see <\/span>Jackson <\/span>v. <\/span><\/i>Modly, <\/span>949 <\/span>E.3d\u00a0 <\/span>763 <\/span>778 <\/span>(D<\/span>.<\/span>C, Cir. 2020}, <\/span>or <\/span>that <\/span>he <\/span>was entiUed <\/span>to <\/span>prospective <\/span>equitable relief, <\/span>see <\/span>NB <\/span>ex\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  reI. <\/span>Peacock <\/span>v. <\/span>District <\/span>of <\/span>Columbia, <\/span>682 <\/span>F 3d <\/span>n, <\/span><\/i>82 <\/span>(D.C<\/span>. <\/span>Cir. 2012)<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  In <\/span>addition, the district court <\/span>did <\/span>not <\/span>abuse <\/span>its discretion in denying appellant’s\u00a0 motion for reconsi<\/span>der<\/span>ation, Ciralsky v<\/span>. <\/span>CIA, 355 E 3d <\/span>661.671 <\/span>(D<\/span>.<\/span>C, Cir. 2004), or his\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  23\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  ,<\/span><\/i>,<\/span><\/i>15.. <\/span><\/i>Sf<\/span>~ <\/span>#~ <\/span>\u2022 <\/span>‘I <\/span>‘<\/span>-\\\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n

                  JEt<\/span>ltit.eb <\/span>~tatc5 <\/span>([ourt <\/span>of <\/span>j\\pp.eaI5\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  FOR <\/span>THE <\/span>DISTRICT <\/span>OF <\/span>COLUMBIA <\/span>CIRCUIT\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  No. 20-5113 \u00a0 <\/span>September <\/span>Term, <\/span>2020\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  motion for recusal, see <\/span>SEC <\/span>v<\/span>, <\/span>Loving <\/span>Sp<\/span>i<\/span>rit Found<\/span>, <\/span>Inc, <\/span>392 F 3d 486 <\/span>493 <\/span>(D,C, Cir.\u00a0 <\/span>2004): <\/span>see <\/span>also <\/span>Litekyv<\/span>, <\/span>United <\/span>States<\/span>, <\/span>510 <\/span>U<\/span>,<\/span>S<\/span>, <\/span>540, <\/span>555 <\/span>(1994)<\/span>,\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Pursuan’l <\/span>:to <\/span>D<\/span>,<\/span>C<\/span>. <\/span>Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published The Clerk <\/span>is\u00a0 <\/span>directed to withhold issuance <\/span>of <\/span>the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any\u00a0 timely petition for rehearing ur petition for rehearing <\/span>en <\/span>bane<\/span>, <\/span>See Fed <\/span>R. <\/span>App P <\/span>411 <\/span>(b);\u00a0 D.C, Cir<\/span>. <\/span>Rule <\/span>41<\/span>,<\/span>.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Per <\/span>Curiam\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  FOR THE COURT:\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Mark J, Langer<\/span>, <\/span>Clerk\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  BY<\/span>: \u00a0 <\/span>\/s\/\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Manuel J <\/span>, <\/span>Castro\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  Deputy Clerk\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  24\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                  ___
                  \nhttp:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/11\/PETITION-FOR-REHEARING-EN-BANC.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                  PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC FILED REGARDING JUDGE AMY BERMAN JACKSON\u00a0 \u00a020-05113\u00a0 \u00a0_________________\u00a0 \u00a0IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________\u00a0 \u00a0JOHN WORTHINGTON, APPELLANT,\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0v.,\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0ONDCP et al\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0APPELLEES.\u00a0 \u00a0___________________\u00a0 \u00a0On Appeal from the United … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-38426","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38426","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=38426"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/38426\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=38426"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=38426"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/stateofthenation.co\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=38426"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}