It looks like the European Commission is very afraid of truth-telling Patriots and the fact-finding Alt Right!

IT’S NOT FUNNY ANYMORE. FAR-RIGHT EXTREMISTS’ USE OF HUMOUR


Humour has become a central weapon of extremist movements to subvert open societies and to lower the threshold towards violence. Especially within the context of a recent wave of far-right terrorist attacks, we witness “playful” ways in communicating racist ideologies. As far-right extremists strategically merge with online cultures, their approach changes fundamentally. This trend has been especially facilitated by the so-called alt-right and has spread globally. This predominantly online movement set new standards to rebrand extremist positions in an ironic guise, blurring the lines between mischief and potentially radicalising messaging. The result is a nihilistic form of humour that is directed against ethnic and sexual minorities and deemed to inspire violent fantasies — and eventually action. This paper scrutinises how humour functions as a potential factor in terms of influencing far-right extremist violence. In doing so, we trace the strategic dissemination of far-right narratives and discuss how extremists conceal their misanthropic messages in order to deny ill intention or purposeful harm. These recent developments pose major challenges for practitioners: As a new generation of violent extremists emerges from digital subcultures without a clear organisational centre, prevention strategies need to renew focus and cope with the intangible nature of online cultures.

Introduction

Humour in the context of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) has largely been discussed as a means to combat extremist ideologies (1). Various counter-narrative campaigns have deployed humour to question the authority of extremist groups and ridicule their ambitions. Even though it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of such campaigns, research has shown that such endeavours are appropriate to spin democratic alternatives for affected youths (2). Thus, the potential of humour as a means of persuasion and disengagement is acknowledged by a variety of actors. Yet, much less attention has been paid to how humour is utilised by extremist groups and subcultures as a means of recruitment. Addressing this gap in P/CVE research and practice has become an urgent issue, especially in light of the digitally mediated wave of far-right terrorism that has struck Christchurch, El Paso and Halle — amongst others.

The perpetrators of these attacks did not have a criminal record and were neither members of extremist organisations nor did they have any links to local scenes. Rather, they emerged from digital subcultures, which share — besides their receptiveness to extremist ideas — a cynical style of humour intended to numb and desensitise its consumers to the use of violence. In their manifestos, the terrorists consequently adopt expressions from meme cultures and online milieus. In particular, image-based forums such as 4chan and 8kun (previously 8chan) developed as places from where extremist messages with humorous and ironic underpinnings spread into the mainstream, thereby making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between organised action and individual acts of provocation. Users of th ese forums rebrand far-right extremist ideologies and make them attractive for new target groups that are not on the radar of practitioners and law enforcement.

Thinking of far-right extremism, we might associate this with backward-looking, stiff and formal zealots who act on the fringes of the political spectrum. Yet, the skinhead image has long been overcome and, in fact, also more recent phenomena like the Identitarians have lost traction throughout Europe. As far- right extremists strategically merge with online cultures, their approach changes drastically. In fact, they have learned the lesson that if — in our digitalised societies — a movement wants to be successful, it needs to be entertaining and participatory. In fact, a shared sense of humour has become an effective tool in terms of immersing individuals into extremist ideologies and, as a consequence, contributed to some of the worst acts of violence in the 21st century.

Analysing the strategic use of humour might thus provide some clues regarding what makes far-right extremist ideas attractive to a generation of digital natives and how digital cultures have become a potential factor in terms of evoking and influencing racist mass violence. So how can we make sense of the connection between humour-driven subcultures and extremist violence? In this research paper we aim to shed some light on the underlying processes that might help us understand recent developments in far-right extremism — and to reflect on how countermeasures need to adapt to combat extremism in the digital age. We begin with a brief primer on the relationship between humour and (far-right) extremism, followed by a description of the recent conflation of online cultures and far-right extremism. We then outline the far-right online ecosystem, highlighting the spread and varieties of humour across different platforms, as well as the potential for violent radicalisation. We conclude by focusing on the problems in tackling online hate cultures and providing some recommendations to help support practitioners working in this area.

Humour and (far-right) extremism. A primer

While it is a truism that extremist movements are only successful if they speak the language of the masses, researchers and practitioners have been repeatedly overwhelmed by the new guises that extremist communication has adopted in the digital era. The playful and ironic re-articulation of white supremacism and ethnonationalism has largely been understood as an innovative strategy to appeal to broader audiences. This is certainly true as we see that the rigid structures and fanatic appearance that once marked far-right extremist groups have gradually faded away. In contrast, such structures have been substituted by a strange mixture of infantile mischief, communicative ambivalence and a strong dose of nihilism that promote extremist ideas. Yet, looking back into the history of the far-right — and other forms of — extremism we can conceive varieties of humour as a steady companion of hate-based mobilisation (3).

Terminology

The terminology used in this paper follows the definitions provided in the 2019 RAN factbook on Far-Right Extremism: A Practical Introduction:

  • “Far-right extremism” is understood as an umbrella concept, which comprises both the radical and the extreme right.
  • Far-right extremism encompasses a range of different ideologies, which may include elements of cultural, ethnic, and/or racial nationalism.
  • Individuals, movements and groups within the far-right extremist spectrum also differ in terms of how far they are willing to take their activism — i.e. whether they are prepared to use violence or not.
  • There are also inconsistencies regarding the concept of the authoritarian state. Some individuals, movements and groups may be in favour of overturning democracy completely, whilst others may support retaining democracy and championing a more heavy-handed state with harsher punishments for crimes (4).

“The most potent weapons known to mankind are satire and ridicule”

civil rights activist Saul Alinsky wrote back in 1971 in his renowned book Rules for Radicals. This advice has been key to winning the hearts and minds of people, especially by progressive movements, as “through humour much is accepted that would have been rejected if presented seriously” (5). In recent years, Alinsky’s book experienced an unexpected renaissance in far-right circles. Their activists learned the lesson that laughter is imminently important to strengthen a collective identity and to better communicate their own positions to outsiders. By reformulating prejudices and disguising them in witty language, the interplay of hatred and amusement regarding the misery of supposedly inferior groups runs like a golden thread through the history of far-right movements. From the Ku Klux Klan to the Nazis, from Pegida to the Identitarians, the mocking denigration of other groups has been a symbol of self-assurance emphasising the notion of supremacy.

Recent generations of far-right extremists have chosen transgressive humour and (supposed) satire as central weapons in the fight against liberal democracy and its “political correctness”, which is depicted as prudish and patronising (6). Praising a “politically incorrect” attitude, humour has been weaponised as a form of resistance against a political culture that is supposedly curtailing free speech. Especially culturally sensitive language has been taunted with vulgar expressions that affect widespread resentments with humorous elements. Hence, derogatory statements are given a humorous guise to make them more compatible with the political mainstream. At the same time, it shifted the limit of tolerance further to the right. This dog-whistling paid off, especially in the digital realm, where special literacy is needed to follow certain references. But why does this pay off so well?

In persuasive terms, humour is especially attractive for extremist groups given its effect on the following:

Emotions – Humour activates repressed emotions, releases inhibitions, and enables an immediate and spontaneous exchange of feelings.

Cognition – Humour stimulates and activates decision-making processes and changes in perspective and replaces rigid behaviour patterns with more flexible ones.

Communication – Humour reduces interpersonal barriers and increases both identification with one’s own group and demarcation from the outside group (7).

In the case of far-right extremism, humour helps to reframe hate-based ideologies, thereby reducing objections towards positions that would otherwise be condemned by the wider public. At the same time, it helps to cover up one’s own barbarity and to ignore the consequences of one’s own rhetoric and actions.

Far-right extremism and online culture

The relationship between humour and (far-right) extremism has been reinforced in the digital context where missing gestures and intonation leave much more space for interpretation to the individual consumer of online content. The internet has been a game changer in terms of organising, communicating and mainstreaming. In fact, digital culture — that is the idea that technology and the internet significantly shape the way we interact — bears great significance regarding how extremists reinvented themselves. Clear-cut distinctions between the digital and analogue, as well as mischief and bigotry, are increasingly difficult to make. Digital culture is based on the core belief that ways of interaction online differ fundamentally from the offline world. “The Internet is serious business”, has become the ironic meme, the meaning of which is actually the exact opposite, which is to say that the internet is not serious business at all, and anyone who thinks otherwise should be corrected and ridiculed (8). But why should P/CVE practitioners care about these trolls and memes? And what are these memes actually?

(6) Topinka (2018): Politically incorrect participatory media, p. 2054.
(7) Wicki (2000): Humor und Entwicklung, pp. 175–176.
(8) De Zeeuw and Tuters (2020): Teh internet is serious business, p. 214.

(1) ISD and RAN CoE (2015): Counter narratives and alternative narratives, p. 6.
(2) Tuck and Silverman (2016): The counter-narrative handbook.
(3) Billig (2001): Humour and Hatred, pp. 271–274.
(4) Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (2019): Far-right extremism, pp. 6–9.
(5) Alinsky (1971): Rules for radicals, p. 75; p. xviii.
(6) Topinka (2018): Politically incorrect participatory media, p. 2054.
(7) Wicki (2000): Humor und Entwicklung, pp. 175–176. (8) De Zeeuw and Tuters (2020): The internet is serious business, p. 214.


Continue reading at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ran_ad-hoc_pap_fre_humor_20210215_en.pdf


 

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