COUNT I: ELECTORS CLAUSE
128. Plaintiff State repeats and re-alleges the allegations above, as if fully set forth herein.
129. The Electors Clause of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, of the Constitution makes clear that only the legislatures of the States are permitted to determine the rules for appointing presidential electors. The pertinent rules here are the state election statutes, specifically those relevant to the presidential election.
130. Non-legislative actors lack authority to amend or nullify election statutes. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104 (quoted supra).
131. Under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985), conscious and express executive policies—even if unwritten—to nullify statutes or to abdicate statutory responsibilities are reviewable to the same extent as if the policies had been written or adopted. Thus, conscious and express actions by State or local election officials to nullify or ignore requirements of election statutes violate the Electors 37 Clause to the same extent as formal modifications by judicial officers or State executive officers.
132. The actions set out in Paragraphs 41-128 constitute non-legislative changes to State election law by executive-branch State election officials, or by judicial officials, in Defendant States Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin, in violation of the Electors Clause.
133. Electors appointed to Electoral College in violation of the Electors Clause cannot cast constitutionally valid votes for the office of President.
COUNT II: EQUAL PROTECTION
134. Plaintiff State repeats and re-alleges the allegations above, as if fully set forth herein.
135. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the use of differential standards in the treatment and tabulation of ballots within a State. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 107.
136. The one-person, one-vote principle requires counting valid votes and not counting invalid votes. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55; Bush II, 531 U.S. at 103 (“the votes eligible for inclusion in the certification are the votes meeting the properly established legal requirements”).
137. The actions set out in Paragraphs 66-73 (Georgia), 80-93 (Michigan), 44-55 (Pennsylvania), and 106-24 (Wisconsin) created differential voting standards in Defendant States Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
138. The actions set out in Paragraphs 66-73 (Georgia), 80-93 (Michigan), 44-55 (Pennsylvania), and 106-24 (Wisconsin) violated the one-person, one- 38 vote principle in Defendant States Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
139. By the shared enterprise of the entire nation electing the President and Vice President, equal protection violations in one State can and do adversely affect and diminish the weight of votes cast in States that lawfully abide by the election structure set forth in the Constitution. Plaintiff State is therefore harmed by this unconstitutional conduct in violation of the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses.
COUNT III: DUE PROCESS
140. Plaintiff State repeats and re-alleges the allegations above, as if fully set forth herein.
141. When election practices reach “the point of patent and fundamental unfairness,” the integrity of the election itself violates substantive due process. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. 1981); Florida State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1183-84 (11th Cir. 2008); Roe v. State of Ala. By & Through Evans, 43 F.3d 574, 580-82 (11th Cir. 1995); Roe v. State of Ala., 68 F.3d 404, 407 (11th Cir. 1995); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F. 3d 873, 878 (3rd Cir. 1994).
142. Under this Court’s precedents on procedural due process, not only intentional failure to follow election law as enacted by a State’s legislature but also random and unauthorized acts by state election officials and their designees in local government can violate the Due Process Clause. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537-41 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984). 39 The difference between intentional acts and random and unauthorized acts is the degree of pre-deprivation review.
143. Defendant States acted unconstitutionally to lower their election standards— including to allow invalid ballots to be counted and valid ballots to not be counted—with the express intent to favor their candidate for President and to alter the outcome of the 2020 election. In many instances these actions occurred in areas having a history of election fraud.
144. The actions set out in Paragraphs 66-73 (Georgia), 80-93 (Michigan), 44-55 (Pennsylvania), and 106-24 (Wisconsin) constitute intentional violations of State election law by State election officials and their designees in Defendant States Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin, in violation of the Due Process Clause
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SCOTUSFiling.pdf
Backup copy of Texas lawsuit:
http://stateofthenation.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/TEXAS_SCOTUS_Filing.pdf